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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s, scientists developed herbicides that could be used to
control weeds. 1 The chemicals were used on cropland prior to planting
* Adjunct Professor, College of Law, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
1. A field trial showed that when an herbicide was applied on a seedbed to kill grasses and the
area was planted to cereal crops without ploughing, the yield was similar to that of a ploughed area. R.A.
Arnott & C.R. Clement, Husbandry as a Substitute for Ploughing, 6 WEED RES. 142, 156 (1966).
Scientists realized that the use of chemicals to control weeds presents opportunities for increased
efficiency in the production of food, fiber, and livestock. W.C. Shaw, Weed Science: Revolution in
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crops and in areas with undesired plant growth. 2 Herbicides also killed
unwanted vegetation and improved grazing areas for livestock. 3
Subsequently, genetic engineering led to the development of crops that
could be sprayed with herbicides after they were already growing. 4 Postemergent applications of herbicides eliminate the need for cultivating row
crops with corresponding reductions in soil erosion and fuel and labor
costs.5 With diminished weed competition, more nutrients, water, and
sunlight are available for crops, resulting in yield increases per acre. 6 By
eliminating the need for cultivation, herbicide usage markedly changed
production practices, leading to more efficient use of inputs that
contributed to larger farms.7
The most widely used herbicide is glyphosate.8 Scientists at Monsanto
developed glyphosate formulations in the 1970s and marketed them as
Roundup products.9 Monsanto scientists also developed geneticallyAgricultural Technology, 12 WEEDS 153, 153 (1964).
2. In the 1950s, weeds caused $4.5 billion in agricultural production losses per year. Shaw, supra
note 1, at 154. It was also noted that herbicides could be used on roadsides, business properties, industrial
sites, yards, and public parks. See Richard J. Dolesh, Weeding Through the Thorny Debate on Glyphosate:
How Will Your Park Agency Kill Weeds When Glyphosate Is Banned?, 55 PARKS & RECREATION 30, 30
(2020); Xinjiang Huang, Stephanie Fong, Linda Deanovic & Thomas M. Young, Toxicity of Herbicides
in Highway Runoff, 24 ENV’T TOXICOL. & CHEM. 2336, 2336 (2004); Dana W. Kolpin et al., Urban
Contributions of Glyphosate and Its Degradate AMPA to Streams in the United States, 354 SCI. TOTAL
ENV’T 191, 191 (2006).
3. See Shaw, supra note 1, at 153-54.
4. The first herbicide-resistant field crop was soybeans. Graham Brookes, Weed Control Changes
and Genetically Modified Herbicide Tolerant Crops in the USA 1996-2012, 5 GM CROPS & FOOD 321,
321 (2014).
5. See Gerald M. Dill et al., Glyphosate: Discovery, Development, Applications, and Properties,
in GLYPHOSATE RESISTANCE IN CROPS AND WEEDS: HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND MANAGEMENT 2-3
(Vijay K. Nandula ed., 2010). The use of herbicides is accompanied by the adoption of no-till planting
that reduces plowing and cultivation practices that use fuel. Leonard P. Gianessi, The Increasing
Importance of Herbicides in Worldwide Crop Production, 69 PEST MGMT. SCI. 1099, 1099 (2013).
6. More accurately, by limiting the number of weeds, herbicides reduce yield losses that
accompany crops competing with weeds. See CHRISTY L. SPRAGUE, 2017 WEED CONTROL GUIDE FOR
FIELD CROPS, MICH. ST. UNIV. EXTENSION, BULL. E0434 (2017). Research suggested that, commencing
in 1964, increased herbicide use over a 15-year span accounted for 20 percent of the increase in corn
yields and 62 percent of the increase in soybean yields in the United States. Gianessi, supra note 5, at
1100.
7. By reducing weed numbers, herbicides enable more nitrogen to be available to crops. See John
R. Teasdale & Michael A. Cavigelli, Subplots Facilitate Assessment of Corn Yield Losses from Weed
Competition in a Long-Term Systems Experiment, 30 AGRONOMY SUSTAIN. DEV. 445, 452 (2010).
Because the use of herbicides reduced the need for labor in cultivating row crops, the amount of land a
farm family could manage increased, leading to larger farms. JAMES M. MACDONALD, PENNI KORB &
ROBERT A. HOPPE, USDA ECON. RSCH. SERV., FARM SIZE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF U.S. CROP
FARMING 27 (2013).
8. See Charles M. Benbrook, Trends in Glyphosate Herbicide Use in the United States and
Globally, 28 ENV’T SCI. EUR. 1, 10 (2016).
9. Glyphosate-based herbicides are produced by more than 90 firms in 20 countries. Some
Organophosphate Insecticides and Herbicides, INT’L AGENCY FOR RSCH. ON CANCER, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. 323 (2017), https://monographs.iarc.who.int/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/mono112.pdf. In the
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engineered seeds that allowed post-emergent applications of Roundup
products.10 Glyphosate-based herbicides are used in the production of
genetically engineered corn, soybean, cotton, sugar beet, and canola
crops.11 Glyphosate is also the most common herbicide used by
homeowners and departments of public works to kill unwanted
vegetation.12
In 1967, dicamba was registered as a herbicide and became available
for use on corn, small grains, and pastures.13 Dicamba is very volatile,14
and applications accompanied by spray drift or volatilization can kill or
injure offsite vegetation.15 In 2017, special formulations of dicamba
known as over–the-top products were marketed for post-emergent use on
genetically engineered soybeans and cotton, and only these dicamba
products are the topic of this article. 16 The use of four products containing
United States, more than 750 products containing glyphosate are being sold. Id. More than 270 million
pounds of glyphosate are being used yearly. DONALD ATWOOD & CLAIRE PAISLEY-JONES, ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY, OFF. OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, PESTICIDES INDUSTRY SALES AND USAGE: 2008-2012 MARKET
ESTIMATES 9 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/pesticides-industrysales-usage-2016_0.pdf (reporting usage in 2012).
10. See William D. McBride & Nora Books, Survey Evidence on Producer Use and Costs of
Genetically Modified Seed, 16 AGRIBUSINESS 6, 7 (2000).
11. In 2013, herbicide-tolerant traits accounted for 88 percent of the soybean, corn, cotton, canola,
and sugar beet crops. Brookes, supra note 4, at 321; see also Charles M. Benbrook, Impacts of Genetically
Engineered Crops on Pesticide Use in the U.S. – The First Sixteen Years, 24 ENV’T SCI. EUR. 1, 2-4
(2012).
12. See Dolesh, supra note 2, at 30; Irene Hanke, Irene Wittmer, Simone Bischofberger, Christian
Stamm & Heinz Singer, Relevance of Urban Glyphosate Use for Surface Water Quality, 81
CHEMOSPHERE 422, 422 (2010); Xinjiang Huang, Theresa Pedersen, Michael Fischer, Richard White &
Thomas M. Young, Herbicide Runoff Along Highways: 1. Field Observations, 38 ENV’T SCI. TECH. 3263,
3263 (2004); Ting Tang et al., Quantification and Characterization of Glyphosate Use and Loss in a
Residential Area, 517 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 207, 207 (2015).
13. See OFF. OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA
PRODUCTS FOR GENETICALLY MODIFIED COTTON AND SOYBEANS: BENEFITS AND IMPACTS 4 (Oct. 31,
2018), https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OPP-2016-0187-0966 [hereinafter EPA, 2018
OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA PRODUCTS].
14. See, e.g., O.C. Burnside & T.L. Lavy, Dissipation of Dicamba, 14 WEEDS 211, 213 (1966);
Richard Behrens & W.E. Lueschen, Dicamba Volatility, 27 WEED SCI. 486, 492 (1979); Sarah Striegel et
al., Spray Solution pH and Soybean Injury as Influenced by Synthetic Auxin Formulation and Spray
Additives, 35 WEED TECH. 113, 114 (2020); Memorandum from Bill Chism, Jonathan Becker, Kelly
Tindall, John Orlowski & Brad Kells, Env’t Prot. Agency, Biological Analysis Branch & Econ. Analysis
Branch, to Dan Kenny & Margaret Hathaway, Env’t Prot. Agency, Herbicide Branch, Registration Div.,
at 28 (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OPP-2020-0492-0003
[hereinafter Chism Memorandum].
15. See Erik D. Sall et al., Quantifying Dicamba Volatility Under Field Conditions: Part II,
Comparative Analysis of 23 Dicamba Volatility Field Trials, 68 J. AGRIC. FOOD CHEM. 2286, 2295
(2020); Stephen D. Strachan, Nancy M. Ferry & Tracy L. Cooper, Vapor Movement of
Aminocyclopyrachlor, Aminopyralid, and Dicamba in the Field, 27 WEED TECH. 143, 153 (2013).
16. The initial registration was granted in 2016 allowing the use of an over-the-top dicamba
product for the 2017 growing season. Final Registration of Dicamba on Dicamba-Tolerant Cotton and
Soybean, OFF. OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY 2 (Nov. 9, 2016), file:///
https://aglaw.psu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Dicamba-XtendiMax-Conditional-Registration-
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dicamba (XtendiMax, FeXapan, Engenia, and Tavium) caused
considerable herbicide drift and volatilization that harmed millions of
acres of nearby crops. 17
Over time, plants can mutate and develop resistance to herbicides. 18
During the past few decades, seventeen weed species that are resistant to
glyphosate have emerged in the United States.19 In fields with large
quantities of resistant weeds, crop yields and profitability may be
significantly diminished.20 To kill glyphosate-resistant weeds, producers
may be able to use a different herbicide, but post-emergence applications
are needed to control weed growth in row crops. 21 Producers began using
dicamba products on fields planted with dicamba-resistant soybean and
cotton seeds in areas where glyphosate-resistant weeds were a problem.22
Producers could apply dicamba products before sowing seeds to kill
existing weeds and then proceed with no-till planting.23 After their crops
had emerged, a post-emergent application of dicamba could be used to
control new weed growth.
Before any pesticide may be marketed in the United States, it must be
registered with the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) under the

11.9.16.pdf [hereinafter EPA, 2016 Final Dicamba Registration].
17. Registration Decision for the Continuation of Uses of Dicamba on Dicamba Tolerant Cotton
and Soybean, REGISTRATION DIV., ENV’T PROT. AGENCY 11 (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OPP-2016-0187-0968 [hereinafter EPA, 2018 Dicamba
Registration Decision]; Kevin Bradley, A Final Report of Dicamba-Injured Soybean Acres, UNIV. OF MO.
INTEGRATED PEST MGMT. (Oct. 30, 2017), https://ipm.missouri.edu/IPCM/2017/10/final_report_dicam
ba_injured_soybean.
18. See Ian Heap & Stephen O. Duke, Overview of Glyphosate-Resistant Weeds Worldwide, 74
PESTICIDE MGMT. SCI. 1040, 1045-48 (2018).
19. Weed scientists reported that weed resistance to glyphosate-based herbicides started in 2000
and resistance by Amaranthus palmeri was causing the greatest reductions in yields. See id. at 1041.
20. See, e.g., A.W. MacRae, T.M. Webster, L.M. Sosnoskie, A.S. Culpepper & J.M. Kichler,
Cotton Yield Loss Potential in Response to Length of Palmer Amaranth (Amaranthus palmeri)
Interference, 17 J. COTTON SCI. 227, 229 (2013); Travis R. Legleiter, Kevin W. Bradley & Raymond E.
Massey, Glyphosate-Resistant Waterhemp (Amaranthus rudis) Control and Economic Returns with
Herbicide Programs in Soybean, 23 WEED TECH. 54, 58 (2009); Debalin Sarangi et al., Confirmation and
Control of Glyphosate-Resistant Common Waterhemp (Amaranthus rudis) in Nebraska, 29 WEED TECH.
82, 89 (2015); Lawrence E. Steckel & Christy L. Sprague, Common Waterhemp (Amaranthus rudis)
Interference in Corn, 52 WEED SCI. 359, 363 (2004).
21. See Jonathan Gressel, Aaron J. Gassmann & Micheal D.K. Owen, How Well Will Stacked
Transgenic Pest/Herbicide Resistances Delay Pests from Evolving Resistance?, 73 PEST MGMT. SCI. 22,
31 (2017); Adam Striegel et al., Economics of Herbicide Programs for Weed Control in Conventional,
Glufosinate, and Dicamba/Glyphosate-Resistant Soybean Across Nebraska, 112 AGRONOMY J. 5158,
5168 (2020).
22. See Rodrigo Werle et al., Survey of Nebraska Farmers’ Adoption of Dicamba-Resistant
Soybean Technology and Dicamba Off-Target Movement, 32 WEED TECH. 754, 758 (2018) (noting the
use of dicamba to control glyphosate-resistant weeds).
23. See Matthew G. Underwood et al., Weed Control, Environmental Impact, and Net Revenue of
Two-Pass Weed Management Strategies in Dicamba-Resistant Soybean, 98 CAN. J. PLANT SCI. 370, 37879 (2017).
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Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”). 24
Additionally, each state must approve uses of pesticides before they are
used in the state.25 Because of the dangers posed by a pesticide’s chemical
ingredients, no pesticide can be registered unless it performs its intended
function without “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”26
Determining a pesticide’s unreasonable adverse effects considers whether
it causes any unreasonable risk to humans or the environment based on
economic, social, or environmental costs from the use of the pesticide. 27
This consideration uses a risk-benefit analysis, often referred to as a costbenefit analysis.28
When issuing dicamba product registrations, the EPA acknowledged
they were less volatile than former dicamba formulations and concluded
they could be used without negatively affecting non-target vegetation.29
Unfortunately, the products were volatile, and their use caused
unacceptable offsite drift and volatilization. 30 Nearby plants, including
non-dicamba-resistant soybeans, were adversely affected.31 The injuries
these products caused led to animosity between neighbors32 and imposed
inordinate costs on state agencies charged with regulating pesticides and
assessing complaints.33 Experts feel that volatilization from dicamba
24. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2018). While pesticides have been regulated since 1947, the major
provisions of FIFRA were adopted in 1972. P.L. 92-516 (Oct. 21, 1972).
25. See, e.g., Illinois Pesticide Act, 415 ILCS 60/3 (2020); Application for New Pesticide
Registration, OFF. OF IND. ST. CHEMIST & SEED COMM’R (Jan. 2020), https://oisc.purdue.edu/pesticide/
pdf/new_product_instructions_and_registration.pdf.
26. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2018).
27. Id. § 136a(bb).
28. Id.; see Pollinator Stewardship Council v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 806 F.3d 520, 522-23 (9th Cir.
2015).
29. See EPA, 2016 Final Dicamba Registration, supra note 16, at 29. However, the registrations
acknowledged that there may be spray drift and volatilization. Id. at 2. Moreover, the agency knew that if
applicators failed to follow the requirements of the label, injury to (or the destruction of) non-target
sensitive vegetation could occur. Letter from Daniel Kenny, Chief, Herbicide Branch, Registration Div.,
Off. of Pesticide Programs, Env’t Prot. Agency, to James Nyangulu, Manager, U.S. Agency Reg. Affs.,
Monsanto Co., at 20 (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www3.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/ppls/000524-0061720161109.pdf.
30. Bradley, supra note 17.
31. The injuries from offsite movement of dicamba products was discussed at a 2017 fall meeting
of the EPA’s meeting of its pesticide advisory committee. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, PESTICIDE PROGRAM
DIALOGUE COMMITTEE MEETING: DAY 1 - NOVEMBER 1, 2017, PROCEEDINGS 100-149 (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2018-01/documents/november-1-2017-ppdc-meetingtranscript.pdf [hereinafter EPA, 2017 DIALOGUE COMMITTEE].
32. See Dan Charles, A Wayward Weedkiller Divides Farm Communities, Harms Wildlife, THE
SALT (Oct. 7, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/10/07/555872494/a-wayward-weedkiller-divides-farm-communities-harms-wildlife; Emily Unglesbee, When Drift Hits Home: Dicamba
Moves Beyond Bean Fields and Into the Public Eye, PROGRESSIVE FARMER (July 20, 2018: 9:30 CDT),
https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/ag/crops/article/2018/07/20/dicamba-moves-beyond-beanfields-eye.
33. E.g., an Indiana pesticide expert sent a letter to the EPA claiming that the state’s response to
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products is the major cause of offsite injuries.34
Due to unacceptable offsite damages, farm and environmental groups
sued the EPA to cancel the 2018 registrations of XtendiMax, FeXapan,
and Engenia. 35 In 2020, a federal circuit court ruled that the EPA lacked
substantial evidence to justify issuing the product registrations under
FIFRA. 36 The applicants had not submitted satisfactory data and had not
shown that the registrations would not “significantly increase the risk of
any unreasonable adverse effect on the environment.”37 The registrations
were subsequently cancelled. 38
Despite documented offsite injuries accompanying dicamba usage,
pesticide manufacturers submitted new applications to register dicamba
products for use during the 2021-2025 crop years.39 After reviewing
documentation submitted by the registrants, the EPA concluded that the
use of a volatility reduction agent and other label changes would preclude
offsite drift and volatilization from injuring nearby vegetation.40 The EPA
issued new registrations in 2020.41 Significant offsite injuries from
dicamba were reported in 2021.42
The injuries to vegetation on non-target properties caused by herbicide
use raise questions about compensating property owners for their losses.
complaints of dicamba injuries had been all-consuming for two years. Letter from Robert D. Waltz, St.
Chemist & Seed Comm’r, Off. of Ind. St. Chemist, to Richard P. Keigwin, Dir. of Pesticide Programs,
Env’t. Prot. Agency 2 (Aug. 29, 2018), https://aapco.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/oisc-dicambacomments-to-epa-8-29-18.pdf [hereinafter Waltz Letter].
34. See Science of Dicamba and Past Experiences: What We Know Today, UNIV. OF ARK., DIV.
OF
AGRIC. SCIENTISTS 2 (April 22, 2021), https://www.agriculture.arkansas.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/04/UADA-Dicamba-Statement.pdf [hereinafter Science of Dicamba].
35. Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 960 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2020).
36. Id. at 1144-45.
37. Id. at 1133 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7)(B)).
38. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, FINAL CANCELLATION ORDER FOR THREE DICAMBA PRODUCTS
(XTENDIMAX WITH VAPORGRIP TECHNOLOGY, ENGENIA, AND FEXAPAN) 3-4 (June 8, 2020),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/202006/documents/final_cancellation_order_for_three_dicamba_products.pdf [hereinafter EPA, 2020 FINAL
CANCELLATION ORDER].
39. OFF. OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
DECISION TO APPROVE REGISTRATION FOR THE USES OF DICAMBA ON DICAMBA TOLERANT COTTON AND
SOYBEAN (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10/documents/dicambadecision_10-27-2020.pdf [hereinafter EPA, 2020 MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING DECISION].
40. Id. at 7, 9.
41. Env’t Prot. Agency, Notice of Pesticide Registration for BASF Engenia Herbicide, EPA Reg.
No. 7969-472 (Nov. 5, 2020) [hereinafter EPA, 2020 BASF Engenia Registration]; Env’t Prot. Agency,
Notice of Pesticide Registration for Bayer XtendiMax with VaporGrip Technology, EPA Reg. No. 2641210 (Oct. 27, 2020) [hereinafter EPA, 2020 Bayer XtendiMax Registration]; Env’t Prot. Agency, Notice
of Pesticide Registration for Syngenta Tavium Plus VaporGrip Technology, EPA Reg. No. 100-1623
(Oct. 27, 2020) [hereinafter EPA, 2020 Syngenta Tavium Registration].
42. See Dicamba 2021 Report on Dicamba Incidents, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY (2021)
https://www.epa.gov/ingredients-used-pesticide-products/dicamba-2021-report-dicamba-incidents
(reporting for all herbicides) [hereinafter EPA, 2021 Incident Report].
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In a settlement with persons whose vegetation was injured by the use of
dicamba products during the 2015-2020 crop years, one manufacturer
agreed to pay up to $400 million for damages.43 This settlement
acknowledged that uses of dicamba may have caused more than $60
million in damages a year. However, only plaintiffs covered by the
agreement collected compensation. Property owners not part of the
litigation and owners suffering injuries in 2021 and subsequent years were
not compensated.
The extensive injuries from applications of dicamba products show
pesticide law being interpreted in a manner that facilitates the production
of greater quantities of marketable crops by controlling weeds despite the
destruction of offsite vegetation.44 Property rights of neighbors are
deemed inconsequential,45 and so is their health.46 With the issuance of
registrations for dicamba products in 2018 and 2020, the EPA decided
that crop production was more important than protecting the vegetation
on neighboring properties, even though injuring offsite vegetation is
counter to existing jurisprudence.47
Furthermore, after the reported offsite injuries in 2017 and 2018, states
knew that dicamba particles entered non-target properties and caused
unprecedented injuries. Yet, because of the economic importance of
soybean and cotton production to local communities and state
economies,48 state governments continued reauthorizing the use of

43. Bayer Reaches a Series of Agreements, BAYER (June 24, 2020), https://www.bayer.com/en/ba
yer-reaches-series-agreements; see also Bader Farms v. Monsanto Co., No. 16-CV-299, 2020 WL
6939364, at *13 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2020).
44. This occurs under the cost-benefit analysis because the benefits of controlling weeds are
substantial. See, e.g., Legleiter et al., supra note 20, at 58; Striegel et al., supra note 21, at 5176.
45. The inconsequential nature of neighboring vegetation was expressed in the omnidirectional
buffer zone required for endangered species but not required in areas where no endangered species are
present. EPA, 2018 OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA PRODUCTS, supra note 13, at 10. The EPA declined to
explain why the buffer was not needed for all vegetation. Id.
46. See Emily Unglesbee, Dicamba Fatigue: States Report Another Year of Dicamba Injury to
EPA, PROGRESSIVE FARMER (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/ag/news/article/201
9/12/09/states-report-another-year-dicamba (noting that state regulators were expressing concern about
human health and safety due to information they are hearing from farm families).
47. Applicators may incur liability under negligence, nuisance, or trespass causes of action for
offsite injuries from pesticide applications. See Jacobs Farm/Del Cabo, Inc. v. West. Farm Serv., Inc., 119
Cal. Rptr. 3d 529, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that applicators may be liable for non-target injuries
under nuisance law); Keller Farms v. Stewart, Case No. 1:16 CV 265 ACL (E.D. Mo. 2018) (deciding
that negligent spraying of pesticides could give rise to liability under Missouri’s trespass law).
48. The major benefit is controlling glyphosate-resistant weeds that reduce crop yields.
Memorandum from John Orlowski & Brad Kells, Env’t Prot. Agency, Biological Analysis Branch, to
Margaret Hathaway & Dan Kenny, Env’t Prot. Agency, Herbicide Branch, Registration Div., at 5 (Oct.
26, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OPP-2020-0492-0004. Increased yields
allow crop production to be more profitable, and the additional income often leads to benefits for local
economies. A monetary benefit per acre cannot be isolated as it depends on the number of resistant weeds
and costs. See EPA, 2018 OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA PRODUCTS, supra note 13, at 10-18.
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dicamba products for the 2019-2020 crop years49 and subsequently for the
2021-2025 crop years.50 Given knowledge of extensive offsite injury,
states authorizing the use of dicamba products were granting dicamba
applicators easements for dicamba particles to enter nearby properties and
destroy vegetation.51 Although a major role of governments is protecting
people and property,52 by approving uses of dicamba, state governments
endorsed the destruction of private property. State approval of dicamba
registrations meant private property was being damaged without
compensating the owners.53
Easements granted by a state government, taking rights from property
owners, were examined by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2021. In Cedar
Point Nursery v. Hassid, the Court found that a California regulation
granting an easement for temporary entries by union organizers on
another’s property was a taking under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause.54 The Court’s examination of the easement showed that by
allowing entry to another’s property, the state had appropriated a right to
invade and property owners’ rights to exclude others. By taking these
rights, the state effected a per se physical taking of private property.55
The rationale of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cedar Point suggests
the approval of dicamba registrations by state governments are
appropriations of neighbors’ right to exclude others from their
properties.56 The registrations grant dicamba applicators easements over
nearby properties allowing dicamba particles to physically enter and
injure vegetation. The state-created easements appropriate property
owners’ right to exclude dicamba particles. By facilitating physical
entries that appropriate property interests, the states have taken property
in violation of the Fifth Amendment.57
To determine the merits of alleging an unconstitutional taking,
Section II of this article looks at the risks of injuries accompanying the
issuance of registrations for dicamba products that led to the judicial
challenge to the 2018 dicamba registrations. Section III shows
49. The registrations for dicamba products were usually issued in the fall for use during the
following year’s growing season. EPA, 2018 OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA PRODUCTS, supra note 13.
50. EPA, 2020 MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING DECISION, supra note 39.
51. See infra Section III(A).
52. See Jeffery M. Gaba, John Locke and the Meaning of the Takings Clause, 72 MO. L. REV. 525
(2007) (relating the role of government with the Takings Clause and examining the treatise John Locke,
The Second Treatise, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 124 (1698) (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1960)).
53. Although legal remedies are available, they are not economically feasible. See infra notes 168171 and accompanying text.
54. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
55. Id. at 2072.
56. See infra Section III(B).
57. See infra Section VI(A).
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applicators’ use of dicamba products interfering with property rights,
especially the right to exclude. With this foundation, takings
jurisprudence is reviewed in Sections IV and V to determine how the
injuries from dicamba usage align with a takings allegation drawing on
the principles enumerated by the Supreme Court. Section VI suggests that
a state’s approval of use of dicamba products authorizes physical
invasions effecting compensable takings. The state governments issuing
the registrations should incur liability under the Takings Clause for
property interests taken.
II. RISKS OF INJURIES TO NON-TARGET PROPERTIES
Persons using herbicides engage in an activity that involves risk of
injuries to vegetation on non-target properties.58 When the wind is
blowing, applications of herbicides can be accompanied by spray drift
carrying herbicide particles beyond their intended areas, injuring or
killing nearby vegetation.59 In addition, temperature changes in a field
where an herbicide has been applied can result in herbicide particles
volatilizing and being carried by air currents to nearby properties. 60 The
volatilization of herbicides after applications to fields can also result in
injuries to non-target vegetation.61 Since dicamba is volatile, applicators
need to use considerable care in applying this herbicide to prevent
unlawful offsite injuries.62
A.

Label Requirements

While advancing the registrations of dicamba products for use during
the 2017 crop year, the registrants maintained that label provisions
delineating requirements for persons applying the products to fields
would prevent spray drift and volatilization from injuring offsite
vegetation.63 The EPA issued the registrations based on studies submitted
by the applicants supporting the conclusion that spray drift would not be
a problem.64 In hindsight, the registrants failed to conduct realistic field
58. See, e.g., Behrens & Lueschen, supra note 14, at 492; Strachan et al., supra note 15, at 143.
59. See EPA, 2018 Dicamba Registration Decision, supra note 17, at 12.
60. See Gordon T. Jones, Jason K. Norsworthy, Tom Barber, Edward Gbur & Greg R. Kruger,
Off-Target Movement of DGA and BAPMA Dicamba to Sensitive Soybean, 31 WEED TECH. 51, 52 (2019);
EPA, 2018 Dicamba Registration Decision, supra note 17, at 20.
61. See Jones et al., supra note 60 at 63.
62. See, e.g., Dicamba – Damage & Complaints, MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (2021),
https://www.mda.state.mn.us/dicamba-damage-complaints.
63. EPA, 2016 Final Dicamba Registration, supra note 16, at 18. The label required a downwind
buffer of 110 feet. Id.
64. The downwind buffer zone and label restrictions were expected to preclude offsite injuries. Id.
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tests to evaluate offsite movement of dicamba particles that would cause
injuries to non-target vegetation.65 More surprisingly, the EPA found that
the applicants’ studies for volatilization showed that an omnidirectional
buffer was not needed.66
The EPA’s issuance of registrations was transmitted to states so that
state pesticide officials could approve uses within their jurisdictions.67
States were able to attach additional requirements for using the dicamba
products as long as the requirements did not pertain to labeling.68 Because
soybean and cotton producers wanted an herbicide that killed glyphosateresistant weeds, states rapidly approved uses of dicamba products, and
applicators began using the products in the spring of 2017. 69 Some states
incorporated a few additional requirements to reduce the potential of
spray drift and volatilization injury.70
Given the dangers posed by most pesticides, every state authorized a
state agency to regulate pesticide products and their uses. State
regulations include a procedure for persons experiencing damages from

Since the EPA only had data from the registrants, the EPA had limited information for its conclusion. Id.
65. See Terence J. Centner, Reconciling Agricultural Production and Property Rights with the Use
of Dicamba Herbicides, 25 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1203-1213 (2021). The evidence used to issue
the 2020 dicamba registrations shows major limitations that precluded an accurate assessment of potential
volatilization injuries. Id.
66. EPA, 2016 Final Dicamba Registration, supra note 16, at 18. Subsequently, the EPA reached
a different conclusion and the 2018 and 2020 labels required omnidirectional buffers. EPA, 2018 Dicamba
Registration Decision, supra note 17, at 13 (requiring an omnidirectional buffer to control volatilization
injuries); EPA, 2020 MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING DECISION, supra note 39, at 8. An omnidirectional
buffer covering all directions from areas receiving spray applications is needed as volatilization involves
the transport of dicamba particles in any direction.
67. See The Pesticide Enforcement Process, NEB. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Undated),
https://nda.nebraska.gov/pesticide/enforcement_process.pdf.
68. National Pesticide Information Center, State Pesticide Regulation (2021),
http://npic.orst.edu/reg/regstate.html. State pesticide offices are often part of a state’s department of
agriculture, although in some states other named departments regulate pesticides. Id.; see also Missouri
Department of Agriculture Issues Special Local Need Labels for FEXAPAN and XTENDIMAX to Reduce OffTarget Crop Injury During the 2018 Growing Season, MO. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://agriculture.mo.gov/news/newsitem/uuid/c44c0256-32df-406c-806d-2654d1c492d3/missouridepartment-of-agriculture-issues-special-local-need-labels-for-fexapan-and-xtendimax-to-reduce-offtarget-crop-injury-during-the-2018-growing-season.
69. See Eric Lipton, Crops in 25 States Damaged by Unintended Drift of Weed Killer, NEW YORK
TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/business/soybeans-pesticide.html. A
reported 35 states had approved use of dicamba products in 2017 and 25 states reported complaints of
offsite injuries. Id.
70. For the 2017 crop year and subsequent years, a few states did adopt an earlier cut-off date
precluding applications beyond a calendar date because of the increased likelihood of offsite injury. See,
e.g., Mary Hightower, Ark. State Plant Board Approves Emergency Rule to Ban Use, Sale of Dicamba
Herbicides, UNIV. OF ARK. SYSTEM DIV. OF AGRIC. (June 23, 2017), https://www.uaex.uada.edu/mediaresources/news/2017/june2017/06-23-2017-Ark-Dicamba.aspx; Dicamba Label Changes–Illinois–
Effective March 1, 2019 through December 31, 2019, ILL. FERTILIZER & CHEM. ASS’N,
https://www.ifca.com/files/IFCA%20Dicamba%2024c%20Label%20Advisory.pdf.
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pesticides to file complaints.71 After receiving a complaint, state officials
can obtain samples, test for pesticide residues, and gather weather data to
determine what caused the damages. 72 This information can be used to
devise appropriate regulations to prevent future injuries and can be used
in actions against persons violating the regulations.73
After dicamba products became available for use in 2017, state
pesticide agencies received a significant number of complaints of injuries
on offsite properties.74 While all types of vegetation can be harmed by
dicamba, many of the filed complaints involved non-dicamba-resistant
soybeans that were planted near dicamba-resistant soybeans.75 In sixteen
states growing dicamba-resistant soybean or cotton crops, fewer than
1,000 complaints per year involving herbicides were normally filed.76
However, the number of complaints in these states jumped to more than
3,000 in 2017 and 2,000 in 2018.77 Applications of dicamba products
were accompanied by spray drift and volatilization that caused
unacceptable injuries to non-target properties.78
B.

Responding to Offsite Injuries

After learning about the uptick in offsite injuries in 2017, the EPA
considered possible responses during its pesticide dialogue committee

71. See, e.g., Dicamba Complaint Form, MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (2021), https://www.mda.state.
mn.us/pesticide-fertilizer-misuse-complaint-form#no-back (delineating how adversely affected
individuals can file a complaint about pesticide use). Because of the large number of dicamba complaints
in Minnesota, the state uses a special dicamba complaint form. Id.
72. See NEB. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 67 (authorizing state pesticide inspectors to inspect
properties and gather all available evidence); Illinois Pesticide Act, 415 ILCS 60/15(2)(D) (2020)
(authorizing inspections).
73. See, e.g., 415 ILCS 60/14 (2020).
74. Prior to the use of dicamba products on dicamba-resistant soybeans and cotton, the EPA
“received no more than 40 dicamba incident reports in a single year.” See EPA, 2018 OVER-THE-TOP
DICAMBA PRODUCTS, supra note 13, at 7. After dicamba products were used by producers in 2017,
reported incidents increased to 1,400 in 2017, 2,600 in 2018, and nearly 3,000 in 2019. EPA, 2020
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING DECISION, supra note 39, at 8-9.
75. Bradley, supra note 17.
76. EPA, 2018 Dicamba Registration Decision, supra note 17, at 12. The analysis was of states
approving the use of dicamba products and used numbers for all herbicide complaints filed before the
introduction of dicamba-resistant cotton and soybean seeds for its baseline. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Letter from Tony L. Cofer, President, Ass’n of Am. Pesticide Control Offs., to Andrew
Wheeler, Adm’r, Env’t Prot. Agency, at 2-3 (Aug. 29, 2018), https://aapco.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/aapco-dicamba-letter-august-29-2018.pdf [hereinafter Cofer Letter]; Letter
from Leo A. Reed, President of the Ass’n of Am. Pesticide Control Officials, to the honorable Andrew
Wheeler, U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency (Apr. 28, 2020), https://aapco.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/aapcodicamba-letter-2020.pdf [hereinafter Reed Letter]; Bob Hartzler, Dicamba: Past, Present, and Future,
IOWA ST. UNIV. EXTENSION & OUTREACH (Dec. 27, 2017), https://crops.extension.iastate.edu/blog/bobhartzler/dicamba-past-present-and-future.
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meeting.79 Physical drift, contamination, temperature inversions,
volatility, and misuse were noted as probable causes of the offsite
damages.80 Weed scientists, state extension personnel, and state pesticide
officials felt most of the injuries were from drift and volatilization from
applications of dicamba products.81 From information provided by state
pesticide officials, the Acting Branch Chief of the Herbicide Branch in
the Registration Division of the EPA surmised that only one in five cases
of offsite damages was reported.82 In Nebraska, responses to a survey
suggested that only seven percent of respondents experiencing injuries
filed an official complaint.83
The EPA’s response was to alter label requirements to reduce
applications that would injure offsite vegetation.84 The over-the-top
dicamba products were classified as restricted use pesticides, 85 meaning
that applicators needed to be certified by a state or territorial authority or
be under the direct supervision of a certified applicator. 86 To obtain
certification, persons needed to meet the applicator requirements set by
FIFRA, which were implemented under a state plan.87 Applications of
restricted use pesticides needed to be documented to show compliance
with the product’s label instructions.88
Other label requirements were also added for the 2018 crop year to
reduce incidents of offsite injuries. 89 However, the labeling in effect for
the 2018 crop year failed to preclude offsite injuries.90 In some states,

79. EPA, 2017 DIALOGUE COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 100-149.
80. Id. at 105.
81. See, e.g., Aaron Hager, Dicamba: What is Success or Failure in 2018?, UNIV. OF ILL. URBANACHAMPAIGN:
FARMDOCDAILY
(March
23,
2018),
https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/04/fdd230318.pdf; Bob Hartzler, Dicamba 2018 - The Iowa Experience, IOWA ST.
UNIV. EXTENSION & OUTREACH (Aug. 15, 2018), https://crops.extension.iastate.edu/cropnews/2018/08/
dicamba-2018-iowa-experience.
82. EPA, 2017 DIALOGUE COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 103.
83. Werle et al., supra note 22, at 754 (surveying 312 farmers).
84. See Letter from Kathryn Montague, Product Manager 23, Herbicide Branch, Registration Div.,
Off. of Pesticide Programs, Env’t Prot. Agency, to Thomas Marvin, Dir., Fed. Regul. Affs., Monsanto
Co., at 1 (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www3.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/ppls/000524-0061720171012.pdf [hereinafter Montague Letter]. By amending the labeling requirements, the EPA
acknowledged that the 2016 labels were inadequate as they allowed too many damages to offsite crops.
Id.
85. EPA, 2018 OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA PRODUCTS, supra note 13, at 5. The EPA is authorized
by regulation to designate restricted use pesticides. 40 C.F.R. § 152.175 (2021).
86. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(e)(1), 136i(a) (2018). Thus, not all applicators of restricted use pesticides
are certified. Id. § 136(e)(1).
87. 40 C.F.R. § 171.1 (2021).
88. 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1 (2018). The dicamba products were restricted use pesticides which required
recordkeeping. See Montague Letter, supra note 84, at 8.
89. See Montague Letter, supra note 84, at 8.
90. See, e.g., Waltz Letter, supra note 33, at 1.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol91/iss2/2

12

Centner: Invasions of Dicamba Particles: Holding States Accountable for Ta

2022]

INVASIONS OF DICAMBA PARTICLES

365

more complaints were filed in 2018 than in 2017.91 Applications of
dicamba products still caused extensive injury to non-target vegetation,
suggesting the products should not qualify for registration.92 Moreover,
state regulatory agencies were unhappy with the financial burden these
products placed on their staff and the limited resources.93 One state was
so backlogged that it was more than a year behind in reviewing
complaints.94
C. Issuing New Registrations in 2018
Although reported offsite injuries occurring in 2017 and 2018
suggested that dicamba products should not qualify for registration, 95 the
EPA reissued registrations for three dicamba products in late 2018 so they
could be used during the 2019-2020 growing seasons.96 For a second time,
the EPA maintained that additional label changes would reduce offsite
injuries.97
It is unclear how the agency reached this conclusion as the revised
labels failed to offer any new policies addressing two of the known causes
of offsite injuries: the problem of volatilization and applicators knowingly
not following label requirements.98 A subsequent examination of the 2018
91. See id. at 2. The state reported a 2660 percent increase in average annual dicamba complaints
for 2017 and 2018. Id.; see also Letter from Jean Payne, President of the Ill. Fertilizer & Chem. Ass’n, to
Reubin Baris, Off. of Pesticide Programs, Env’t Prot. Agency (Aug. 16, 2018),
https://ifca.com/files/IFCA%20Letter%20to%20USEPA%20Dicamba%20Labels%208%2016%202018.
pdf [hereinafter Payne Letter]; Cofer Letter, supra note 78 (reporting on information garnered from
weekly surveys of states).
92. The EPA had granted dicamba registrations based on its conclusion from data submitted by
the registrants that offsite injuries would not occur. EPA, 2016 Final Dicamba Registration, supra note
16, at 29. The offsite injuries proved the data failed to accurately measure offsite injuries so were
insufficient to justify the registrations. The widespread injuries showed that dicamba products could not
be used without causing unreasonable adverse effects. This meant the registrations did not qualify for
registration. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2018).
93. See Cofer Letter, supra note 78, at 2-3. It was claimed that the manpower committed to
dicamba-related complaints was unsustainable. Id.
94. See Unglesbee, supra note 46.
95. See Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1144. The court found that the EPA failed to conduct
a proper analysis of the risks so lacked substantial evidence for approving the registrations. Id.
96. EPA, 2018 Dicamba Registration Decision, supra note 17.
97. The first additional label change came in late 2017. See Montague Letter, supra note 84, at 23. The second label change occurred in late 2018. See EPA, 2018 Dicamba Registration Decision, supra
note 17, at 5. Actually, the 2018 registration approval said that the label changes would address “some of
the postulated causes for off-target dicamba movement.” EPA, 2018 OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA
PRODUCTS, supra note 13, at 5. The EPA felt that addressing some causes was sufficient to justify new
registrations.
98. See Aaron Hager, 2019 Observations from the Field: Dicamba, THE BULLETIN: PEST MGMT.
AND CROP DEV. INFO. FOR ILL. 3 (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.no-tillfarmer.com/articles/9035-reports-ofdicamba-damage-higher-than-last-year. It was reported that volatilization can occur up to 4 days after
application. Id.; see also ILL. FERTILIZER & CHEM. ASS’N 15 & 17 (August 8, 2018) (reporting non-
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registrations by the U.S. EPA Office of Inspector General suggested that
the agency probably had not complied with the FIFRA registration
requirements. 99 It was found that senior-level changes to, or omissions
from, scientific documents meant the registrations were legally
vulnerable. 100 The changes and omissions caused the EPA to substantially
understate some risks and fail to acknowledge others entirely.101 One EPA
scientist reported that “senior management provided direction to consider
registrants’ data for reported dicamba damages instead of [the EPA’s]
divisional data sources.”102 Another scientist reported that the
recommended approach of using visual signs of plant injury was ignored
in favor of using plant height as a measure of dicamba’s adverse effects
on plants.103 Scientists employed by the EPA “felt directed to change the
science to support a certain decision . . . .”104
Reports of injuries during the 2019 growing season showed that the
revised 2018 label requirements failed to appreciably reduce offsite
damages.105 Despite additional obligations imposed on applicators by the
2018 labels, state regulatory agencies in Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Missouri,
and Nebraska received more complaints in 2019 than 2018. 106 However,
in other areas, the 2018 labels reduced injuries because producers stopped
planting non-dicamba-resistant soybeans and started planting dicambaresistant soybeans.107 The switch to dicamba-resistant soybeans
compliance with label directions and volatilization injuries).
99. EPA Deviated from Typical Procedures in Its 2018 Dicamba Pesticide Registration Decision,
Report No. 21-E-0146, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (May 24, 2021),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2021-05/documents/_epaoig20210524-21-e-0146.pdf
[hereinafter EPA, 2021 OFF. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL].
100. Id. at 1.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 10.
103. Id. at 9. Senior EPA scientists had reported that a 10 percent visual signs of injury should be
employed in conjunction with height to predict yield loss. Memorandum from Michael Wagman, Frank
T. Farruggia, Ed Odenkirchen & Jennifer Connolly, Env’t Prot. Agency, Env’t Fate and Effects Div., to
Margaret Hathaway, Emily Schmid & Daniel Kenny, Env’t Prot. Agency, Herbicide Branch, Registration
Div., at 51-52, 134-135 (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OPP-20200492-0002 [hereinafter Wagman Memorandum]. The EPA declined to follow this report and, by only
considering plant height, found fewer acreages of adversely affected crops. EPA, 2021 OFF. OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, supra note 99, at 9-10.
104. EPA, 2021 OFF. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 99, at 10.
105. See Reed Letter, supra note 78, at 2.
106. April 2020 Dicamba Survey, ASS’N OF AM. PESTICIDE CONTROL OFFICIALS 9-10 (2020),
https://aapco.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/pdf-all-data-dicamba-april-2020.pdf [hereinafter ASS’N OF
AM. PESTICIDE CONTROL OFFICIALS]; see also Dicamba Brings in Record Number of Complaints, ILL.
FERTILIZER & CHEM. ASS’N (Undated), https://ifca.com/resource_display/?id=3821&title=Dicamba+bri
ngs+in+record+number+of+complaints#:~:text=With%20455%20dicamba%2Drelated%20pesticide,tot
al%20of%20336%20dicamba%20complaints.
107. See Alayna DeMartini, Dicamba Complaints Slowly Filtering In, OHIO ST. UNIV. COLL. OF
FOOD, AGRIC., & ENV’T SCIS. (Aug. 11, 2017), https://cfaes.osu.edu/news/articles/dicamba-complaintsslowly-filtering-in.
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eliminated acreages of crops that might experience injury.108
Additionally, the more stringent application requirements helped reduce
application practices that contributed to injuries. 109 Nevertheless, the
actual number of injuries remained elusive as property owners often
declined to file incident reports.110 The EPA reported “that only 6 percent
of growers reported incidents when herbicide damage was detected in
2019 and 2020.”111 The 2018 labels’ lack of success in reducing injuries
led the Association of American Pesticide Control Officials to
recommend that the EPA prohibit post-emergent soybean applications in
future dicamba products registrations.112
In 2020, complaints continued in some states. Iowa reported that more
complaints of agricultural pesticide misuse were filed in 2020 than any of
the previous eight years.113 In 2021, the EPA received nearly 3,500 reports
alleging offsite injuries on numerous crops in ten states that included more
than one million acres of non-dicamba-resistant soybeans.114 Minnesota
and North Dakota experienced complaints of offsite injuries in record
numbers.115 The data from 2018 to 2021 disclose that additional labeling
provisions have not prevented offsite injuries. The required use of a
volatility reduction agent has not stopped dicamba particles from being
carried offsite. Applications of dicamba on soybeans and cotton are
accompanied by drift and volatilization that cause unacceptable offsite
injuries.
D. The National Family Farm Coalition Lawsuit
Given concerns about the livelihoods of farmers experiencing injuries
to vegetation from nearby dicamba spray applications, several farm and
108. The production changes to dicamba-resistant soybeans were cited as being anticompetitive.
See Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal., 960 F.3d at 1142-43.
109. These included limitations on wind speeds, reduction in times during the day for applying
dicamba sprays, and tank-cleanout directions. See EPA, 2018 OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA PRODUCTS, supra
note 13, at 5.
110. DeMartini, supra note 107.
111. See EPA, 2021 Incident Report, supra note 42.
112. Reed Letter, supra note 78, at 3.
113. Pesticide Use Investigations, IOWA DEP’T OF AGRIC. & LAND STEWARDSHIP (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://iowaagriculture.gov/pesticide-bureau/pesticide-use-investigations-and-enforcement.
114. Memorandum from Kelly Tindall, Jonathan Becker, John Orlowski, Caleb Hawkins & Brad
Kells, Env’t Prot. Agency, Off. of Chem. Safety and Pollution Prevention, to Lindsay Roe & Margaret
Hathaway, Env’t Prot. Agency, Herbicide Branch, Registration Div., at 5 & 18, table 3 (Dec. 15, 2021),
https://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/epa-hq-opp-2020-0492-0021_content_23279.pdf.
115. Paula Mohr, Dicamba Damage Complaints Surge in 2021 in Minnesota, THE FARMER (Oct.
7, 2021), https://www.farmprogress.com/herbicide/dicamba-damage-complaints-surge-2021-minnesota;
Michelle Rook & Mikkel Pates, Off-Target Dicamba Damage in 2021 May Be the Worst Year Yet in the
Upper Midwest, AGWEEK (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.agweek.com/business/off-target-dicambadamage-in-2021-may-be-the-worst-year-yet-in-the-upper-midwest.
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environmental groups filed the National Family Farm Coalition v.
Environmental Protection Agency (“NFFC”) lawsuit.116 The petitioners
contended that the EPA lacked substantial evidence supporting
qualification of the dicamba products for registration. 117 Petitioners
argued that the 2018 registrations, which allowed applications of dicamba
during the 2019-2020 growing seasons, should be vacated because the
EPA made multiple errors in granting the conditional registrations. 118
Farmers’ property interests in crops and landscapes were being damaged
by offsite spray injuries from dicamba applications.119
In June 2020, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in
the NFFC lawsuit.120 In finding that the EPA erred in issuing the 2018
registrations, the court found that three problems compromised the EPA’s
decisions to issue the dicamba registrations: (1) understating risks, (2)
failing to acknowledge risks, and (3) failing to consider costs.121 Each
issue meant the agency failed to evaluate the risks required by FIFRA’s
cost-benefit analysis to ensure that there was no unreasonable adverse
effect on the environment. 122 In the absence of a proper evaluation of
risks, the EPA lacked substantial evidence that supported issuing the
registrations.123
Looking at the 2018 registrations’ approval, the NFFC court found that
the EPA underestimated the acreage planted with dicamba-resistant crops
associated with complaints of injuries and underreported risks of
damages.124 Despite the 2017 written report in which the acting chief of
the herbicides branch of the EPA estimated that only 20 percent of cases
involving injuries were likely reported, the EPA’s 2018 registration
documentation said that landowners attributed all crop losses to dicamba
usage.125 The EPA also ignored evidence from pesticide officials that
116. Petitioners Opening Brief, NFFC v. Env’t Prot. Agency, Case No. 17-70196 (9th Cir. Feb. 9,
2018) [hereinafter NFFC Petitioners Opening Brief]. See NFFC, 960 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2020). Actually,
the petitioners had filed a petition for review on January 20, 2017, contesting the earlier registrations. Id.
at 8; see also George Kimbrell, Sylvia Wu & Audrey Leonard, Will Regulators Catch the Drift? NFFC v.
EPA and Breathing New Life into Pesticide Regulation, 51 ENV’T LAW 667, 706-717 (2021) (detailing
the litigation).
117. NFFC Petitioners Opening Brief, supra note 116, at 15-16.
118. NFFC, 960 F.3d at 1145.
119. Id. at 1138 & 1143.
120. Id. at 1120-45.
121. Id.at 1136-43.
122. Id. at 1133 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7)(B)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 2018 OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA PRODUCTS, supra note 13, at 6. Subsequent research showed
that the claim of dicamba products not causing injuries was incorrect. LEE VAN WYCHEN, ROBERT
NICHOLS, GREG KRUGER, PHIL BANKS & SCOTT SENSEMAN, WEED SCI. SOC’Y OF AM., WSSA
RESEARCH WORKSHOP FOR MANAGING DICAMBA OFF-TARGET MOVEMENT: FINAL REPORT 4 (2018),
http://wssa.net/wp-content/uploads/Dicamba-Report_6_30_2018.pdf (reporting that experts identified

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol91/iss2/2

16

Centner: Invasions of Dicamba Particles: Holding States Accountable for Ta

2022]

INVASIONS OF DICAMBA PARTICLES

369

damages were underreported to maintain good relationships with
neighbors, fear of losing organic certification, and perceptions that
governments would not take action.126 By adopting offsite damages data
and studies provided by registrants , the EPA ignored considerable
documentation of risks reported by scientists and officials associated with
the state regulation of pesticides.127 The total evidence supported a finding
that the number of filed complaints significantly underreported
damages.128
The second problem with the approval of the 2018 registrations was
that the EPA failed to acknowledge other risks that should have been
considered. 129 The NFFC court observed that the EPA had not considered
the risk of applicators failing to comply with the mandated product-label
instructions.130 Surveys and accounts suggested that applicators’
noncompliance with the labels’ spray application directions was a major
cause of offsite injuries.131 Given that the labels were more than 25 pages
in length,132 and contained infeasible or impractical requirements for
many dicamba applicators, 133 it was unsurprising that products were not
applied in conformance with the law. Although evidence supported a
conclusion that misuse would occur and cause harm to off-target
properties, the EPA ignored this risk.134 Another risk was that wind and
adverse weather conditions would prevent applicators from having
sufficient time to apply dicamba products in compliance with the label
instructions.135 The labels only allow dicamba products to be applied up
volatilization as a problem).
126. See 2018 OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA PRODUCTS, supra note 13, at 7; EPA, 2018 Dicamba
Registration Decision, supra note 17, at 11.
127. NFFC, 960 F.3d at 1124-25. The court found that the EPA substantially understated risks and
failed to acknowledge risks. Id.
128. Id. See EPA, 2017 DIALOGUE COMMITTEE, supra note 31, at 103; Aaron Hager, Reports of
Dicamba Damage Higher than Last Year, NO-TILL FARMER (June 17, 2019), https://www.notillfarmer.com/articles/9035-reports-of-dicamba-damage-higher-than-last-year; Hartzler, supra note 81,
at 2; Emily Uglesbee, Dicamba Drift Injury: Can Property Owners Recover? AGFAX (July 23, 2018),
https://agfax.com/2018/07/23/dicamba-drift-injury-can-property-owners-recover-dtn.
129. NFFC, 960 F.3d at 1139.
130. Id. at 1140-41.
131. See, e.g., Melody M. Bomgardner, Widespread Crop Damage from Dicamba Herbicide Fuels
Controversy, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS 4 (Aug. 16, 2017), https://cen.acs.org/articles/95/i33/Widespreadcrop-damage-dicamba-herbicide.html. It was noted that even conscientious applicators would have
difficulties following the stringent label requirements. Id.; see also Payne Letter, supra note 91; Reed
Letter, supra note 78, at 2.
132. See, e.g., Env’t Prot. Agency, Notice of Pesticide Registration, EPA Reg. No. 7969-345,
Engenia Herbicide (Nov. 2, 2018). https://ordspub.epa.gov/ords/pesticides/f?p=PPLS:102:::NO::P102_R
EG_NUM:7969-345.
133. See Reed Letter, supra note 78, at 2.
134. NFFC, 960 F.3d at 1142. The EPA had not acknowledged the evidence showing difficulties
in complying with the products’ labels. Id.
135. Id. at 1141.
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to 45 days after planting or before the plants start to bloom.136 Due to the
need to control weeds, spray applications would be made when it was too
windy and drift would be carried to nearby properties. 137 Applicators
would violate the label requirement to gain increased yields.
The NFFC court also found that the EPA’s conclusion that damages
were “potential” and “alleged” was contrary to the evidence presented. 138
The EPA had claimed it lacked information to quantify damages caused
by injuries from applications of dicamba products, so offsite damages did
not need to be considered.139 Yet university weed scientists, state
extension personnel, and state pesticide officials had reported data and
information showing injured vegetation.140 Scientists had published
research on the calculation of yield losses due to exposure to dicamba. 141
A meta-analysis of previously published field studies had estimated
soybean yield losses from dicamba.142 Various field trials and research
findings on dicamba drift and yield losses were available for damage
calculations.143 One university weed scientist estimated that 3.6 million
acres of non-dicamba-resistant soybeans had been damaged in 2017.144
Because the record showed that dicamba products had caused damages,
injury was established, and the EPA should have proceeded with the
calculation of estimated damages.145
The EPA’s failure to adequately consider risks and damages as
136. See Bayer, New Label Highlights Xtendimax: 2021 Season and Beyond.
https://www.roundupreadyxtend.com/Documents/XM-2021-beyond-label-highlights.pdf.
137. See IFCA Dicamba Survey 2018, ILL. FERTILIZER & CHEM. ASS’N 15 (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://ifca.com/media/web/1533822692_IFCA%20Dicamba%20Survey%20Results%202018.pdf.
138. NFFC, 960 F.3d at 1144.
139. Id. at 1124, 1138.
140. See, e.g., Kevin Bradley, July 15 Dicamba Injury Update. Different Year, Same Questions,
UNIV. OF MO.: INTEGRATED PEST MGMT. (July 19, 2018), https://ipm.missouri.edu/IPCM/2018/7/July15-Dicamba-injury-update-different-year-same-questions. Research suggested a 5 percent yield loss of
non-resistant soybeans from dicamba drift beyond the required buffer distance. Gordon T. Jones, Jason
K. Norsworthy & Tom Barber, Off-Target Movement of Diglycolamine Dicamba to Non-Dicamba
Soybean Using Practices to Minimize Primary Drift, 31 WEED TECH. 24, 35 (2019).
141. See, e.g., O. Adewale Osipitan, Jon Scott & Stevan Knezevic, Glyphosate-Resistant Soybean
Response to Micro-Rates of Three Dicamba-Based Herbicides, 2 AGROSYST. GEOSCI. ENV’T 180052
(2019); O. Adewale Osipitan, Jon Scott & Stevan Knezevic, Effects of Dicamba Micro-Rates on Yields of
Non-Dicamba Soybeans, UNIV. OF NEB., INST. AGRIC. & NAT. RES.: CROPWATCH (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://cropwatch.unl.edu/2019/effects-dicamba-micro-rates-yields-non-dicamba-soybeans; Andrew P.
Robinson, David M. Simpson & William G. Johnson, Response of Glyphosate-Tolerant Soybean Yield
Components to Dicamba Exposure, 61 WEED SCI. 526, 534 (2013).
142. Andrew R. Kniss, Soybean Response to Dicamba: A Meta-Analysis, 32 WEED TECH. 507, 507
(2018).
143. See Estevam Matheus Costa et al., Simulated Drift of Dicamba and 2,4-D on Soybeans: Effects
of Application Dose and Time, 36 BIOSCI. J. 857, 861 (2020). One research project found 1-3 percent
potential yield losses from secondary drift. Jones et al., supra note 60, at 63. Other research had calculated
yield losses related to buffer distance of non-resistant soybeans. Jones et al., supra note 140, at 35.
144. EPA, 2018 Dicamba Registration Decision, supra note 17, at 5; Bradley, supra note 17.
145. NFFC, 960 F.3d at 1144.
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mandated by FIFRA meant it could not justify issuance of the 2018
registrations.146 The court concluded that the EPA had ignored evidence
of “enormous and unprecedented damage” and ordered the registrations
to be vacated.147 Subsequently, the registrations were cancelled by the
EPA.148 Yet, several months later, the agency issued new five-year
registrations for three dicamba products for use during the 2021-2025
crop years.149 These registrations have been challenged in the American
Soybean Association v. Environmental Protection Agency lawsuit before
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.150 The Federal District Court of
Arizona has recently lifted the earlier stay so plaintiffs can proceed with
their request for declaratory and equitable relief.151
III. INTERFERING WITH PROPERTY RIGHTS
When the EPA issued the initial over-the-top dicamba registrations
enabling the products to be used during the 2017 crop year, the agency
reached the conclusion that a downwind buffer zone at the time of
application would preclude offsite exposure from spray drift and
volatilization.152 Thus, the registrations assumed that usage would not
interfere with the property rights of neighbors. However, injuries to
offsite vegetation did occur. Two different explanations were offered

146. The EPA had lacked substantial evidence supporting the registrations. NFFC, 960 F.3d at
1144.
147. Id.
148. EPA, 2020 FINAL CANCELLATION ORDER, supra note 38.
149. EPA, 2020 BASF Engenia Registration, supra note 41; EPA, 2020 Bayer XtendiMax
Registration, supra note 41; EPA, 2020 Syngenta Tavium Registration, supra note 41 see also ENV’T
PROT. AGENCY, EPA Approves Label Amendments that Further Restrict the Use of Over-the-Top
Dicamba in Minnesota and Iowa, March 15, 2022 (amending requirements for Iowa and Minnesota)
https://www.epa.gov/pesticides/epa-approves-label-amendments-further-restrict-use-over-top-dicambaminnesota-and-iowa.
150. Am. Soybean Ass’n v. Wheeler, No. 20-1441 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2020)
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2020-11/documents/usca_case_20-1441_0.pdf. Several different
lawsuits were consolidated into this suit, and numerous pleadings and motions have been filed. See also
Complaint, Am. Soybean Ass’n v. Wheeler, No. 20-cv-03190, https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/20
20-11/documents/american_soybean_assoc_complaint.pdf (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2020) (challenging
limitations on dicamba usage that reduce producers’ profitability); Entry of Clerk’s Order of
Consolidation, Plains Cotton Growers, Inc. v. Regan, No. 20-1484, (D.C. Cir. Dec. 4, 2020); Entry of
Clerk’s Order of Consolidation, Plains Cotton Growers, Inc. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 20-61055, (5th
Cir. Nov. 13, 2020); Entry of Clerk’s Order of Consolidation, Am. Soybean Ass’n v. Regan, No. 20-1441,
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 5, 2020); Am. Soybean Ass’n v. Regan, No. 22-1048 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 2022)
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2022-03/american-soybean-association-petition-forreview.pdf.
151. Complaint, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 20-cv-00555-DCB (D. Ariz.
Dec. 23, 2020); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 20-cv-00555 (Oct. 14, 2022) (lifting
stay) https://judicialcaselaw.com/courts/azd/cases/4_20-cv-00555-DCB.
152. EPA, 2016 Final Dicamba Registration, supra note 16, at 29.
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regarding the cause of the offsite injuries. Applicators and several state
weed scientists felt many of the injuries occurred due to the volatility of
the products.153 Alternatively, applicator misuse was the cause of some
injuries as applicators were not following the label requirements. 154 Yet,
the different explanations do not alter the fact that offsite injuries
occurring in 2017 meant the EPA’s conclusion asserting no observed
adverse effect from exposure to dicamba beyond a field’s edge was
incorrect.155 In addition, the injuries showed that the EPA’s reliance on a
registrant’s single flux study analyzing bystander exposure was
misplaced.156 The dicamba products were volatile and dicamba particles
were injuring vegetation on offsite properties. 157
A.

Offsite Injuries and Easements

For the 2018 registrations, the EPA acknowledged a need for an
omnidirectional buffer zone in counties where endangered species were
present.158 Due to the applicability of the federal Endangered Species
Act,159 the registrations had to delineate provisions that would preclude
the taking of an endangered species.160 The addition of an omnidirectional
buffer requirement applicable to areas with endangered species admitted
that the use of dicamba products was accompanied by volatilization that
deposited dicamba particles on non-target properties.161 However, despite
this admission, the EPA decided not to require an omnidirectional buffer
in areas where endangered species were not present, which involves most

153. E.g., experts in Iowa felt volatility was a factor in 25 percent of the incidences they
investigated. Hager, supra note 98; see also Bomgardner, supra note 131, at 2; Hartzler, supra note 78;
2018 Dicamba Survey Report, N.D. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (2018), https://www.nd.gov/ndda/sites/default/file
s/resource/2018%20Dicamba%20Survey%20Report.pdf.
154. See EPA, 2018 Registration Decision, supra note 17, at 10.
155. EPA, 2016 Final Dicamba Registration, supra note 16, at 18. The EPA declined to require an
omnidirectional buffer for dicamba products as the registrant reported there was no observed adverse
effect concentration at the field’s edge. Id. This conclusion is contrary to scientific research exploring
volatilization. See, e.g., Hager, supra note 128; Hartzler, supra note 78.
156. EPA, 2016 Final Dicamba Registration, supra note 16, at 12, 18.
157. The EPA declined to recognize that the submitted studies were wrong, and the EPA continued
to rely on its 2016 risk assessments and conclusions. See Kimbrell et al., supra note 116, at 698.
158. EPA, 2018 OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA PRODUCTS, supra note 13, at 10 (requiring a 57-foot
omnidirectional buffer).
159. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. Law 93-205 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 15311544 (2018)).
160. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2018). The EPA had determined that information required
reevaluating potential injuries to endangered species. EPA, 2018 Dicamba Registration Decision, supra
note 17, at 12. A taking of an endangered species “means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2018).
161. The EPA required an omnidirectional buffer to preclude applicators from violating the “take”
provision of § 9 of the Endangered Species Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2018).
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fields where dicamba products are applied. 162 The EPA never explained
why an omnidirectional buffer was not needed to protect offsite crops and
vegetation from volatilization in areas lacking endangered species. 163
With the documentation of offsite injuries to vegetation commencing
in 2017, most applicators knew that dicamba applications could interfere
with the rights of neighboring property owners. Starting with the 2018
registrations, dicamba products were classified as restricted use
pesticides.164 This meant all applicators would receive training on how to
apply the products before they could legally apply dicamba. Given the
buffer zones delineated in the labels and mandatory applicator training,
every person lawfully applying dicamba products in 2018 and subsequent
years knew that drift and volatilization could deposit harmful dicamba
particles on neighboring properties.165 If offsite injuries occurred, the
rights of non-target property owners to be secure in their properties would
be violated and applicators could incur liability under negligence,
nuisance, or trespass law. 166 Depending on the evidence, applicators
might also incur liability for violating label instructions. 167
However, applicators also knew that it was unlikely that a neighboring

162. A map showing counties where dicamba applications might affect endangered species is
available on web. See Bulletins Live! Two – View the Bulletins, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/endangered-species/bulletins-live-two-view-bulletins (last visited Nov. 23, 2022);
Rodrigo Werle, Understanding the Additional Buffer Requirements for Dicamba Applications in Xtend
(Dicamba-Tolerant) Crops, WIS. WEED SCI., https://www.wiscweeds.info/post/dicamba-bufferrequirements/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2022) (including a map of counties with endangered species).
163. See EPA, 2018 Dicamba Registration Decision, supra note 17, at 20. This meant the EPA was
condoning the injury of plants on offsite properties by allowing states to register these dicamba products.
164. 40 C.F.R. § 152.175 (2021). See EPA, 2018 OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA PRODUCTS, supra note
13, at 5.
165. The offsite injuries from applications of dicamba products were also widely reported in the
farm press providing applicators with knowledge of offsite injuries. See, e.g., Jackie Pucci, Daily Dicamba
Update: Q&A with Heartland Co-Op’s Dave Coppess, CROPLIFE (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://www.croplife.com/dicamba/talking-dicamba-qa-with-heartland-co-ops-dave-coppess/;
Larry
Steckel, Dicamba Drift Problems Not an Aberration: A Veteran Tennessee Weed Scientist’s Perspective,
FARMPROGRESS (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.farmprogress.com/weeds/dicamba-drift-problems-notaberration; Unglesbee, supra notes 32, 126.
166. E.g., an Iowa court found that negligence supported a verdict for damages for a crop injured
by an herbicide. Martin v. Jaekel, 188 N.W.2d 331, 332 (Iowa 1971). However, some jurisdictions decline
to recognize particles being carried through the air as trespasses because they are intangible substances.
See, e.g., John Larkin, Inc. v. Marceau, 959 A.2d 551, 556 (Vt. 2008); Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron
Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). In these states, nuisance or negligence law would need
to be used to establish liability.
167. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-2646(7)(a) (2020) (making it unlawful to use a pesticide that is
likely to adversely affect vegetation); Illinois Pesticide Act, 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/24.1 (2020)
(providing for administrative actions and penalties); see also generally MARK LEBLANC, IND. ST.
CHEMIST & SEED COMM’R, FY 2021-22 PESTICIDE ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE POLICY (2021),
https://www.oisc.purdue.edu/pesticide/pdf/pesticide_enforcement_response_policy_061121.pdf
(delineating guidance for the state enforcement of violations of Indiana’s pesticide law and regulations).
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property owner suffering damages would bring a lawsuit.168 Three
reasons suggest lawsuits for damages from dicamba offsite injuries would
be rare. First, rural property owners do not want to sue neighbors since
such lawsuits are stressful and disruptive to their communities.169 Second,
the burden of proof to establish causation is so demanding that a
successful lawsuit is uncertain.170 Property owners suffering losses do not
want to proceed with litigation in which they might lose. Third, the
damages suffered by most property owners would not be large enough to
justify the costs of a lawsuit.171 Lawsuits for damages from pesticide drift
are expensive.
Of course, state governments can bring actions to cite applicators for
violation of label requirements when offsite properties are damaged. 172
However, state agencies generally do not commence actions for offsite
drift and volatilization injuries due the difficulty of proving the source of
the injuries and the lack of personnel resources. 173 In some states, the fines
imposed under state law were so low that it was more profitable for
applicators to apply dicamba products illegally to kill weeds and pay the
fine than suffer reductions in crop yields due to weed growth. 174
168. See Daniel L. Moeller, Superfund, Pesticide Regulation, and Spray Drift: Rethinking the
Federal Pesticide Regulatory Framework to Provide Alternative Remedies for Pesticide Damage, 104
IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1540 (2019). The defendants in lawsuits concerning damages from spray drift have
a number of defenses that require plaintiffs to expend considerable funds hiring experts to meet the
necessary causation requirements. See, e.g., Cox v. Helena Chem. Co., 630 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. Ct. App.
2020).
169. See, e.g., 2018 OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA PRODUCTS, supra note 13, at 7. In some cases,
landowners were threatening farmers using dicamba products. Unglesbee, supra note 32, at 4-5.
170. The most challenging issue for the plaintiffs is usually establishing causation required for
negligence and nuisance claims. See Ward v. N.E. Tex. Farmers Co-op Elevator, 909 S.W.2d 143, 15051 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995); Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union, 817 N.W.2d 693, 712 (Minn. 2012); Jud.
Council Coordination Procs. 4435 – TPC Cases, No. E052246, 2014 WL 4477390 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept.
12, 2014). Another problem is that defendants with significant financial resources can raise challenges
and cause delays that are costly for plaintiffs. See Moeller, supra note 168, at 1540.
171. For example, in the case involving the use of a dicamba product that injured peach trees, the
plaintiff incurred $48,302.58 in costs in securing a judgment against the manufacturer. Bader Farms, Inc.
v. Monsanto Co., No. 16-cv-00299-SNLJ, Casetext: Smarter Legal Research (E.D. Mo. May 17, 2021).
172. Illinois can enforce violations that include violation of label, applying in a negligent manner,
and failing to keep and maintain records. Illinois Pesticide Act, 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/13.3 (2020).
173. With increases of complaints to state pesticide agencies, personnel were already stretched to
respond to each complaint and did not have time to proceed further with citations. See Reed Letter, supra
note 78, at 2; Unglesbee, supra note 46.
174. Arkansas realized the fines were too low so increased the amounts of fines for misusing
herbicides to $25,000 for egregious violations. See David Bennett, Arkansas Bills Would Increase
Penalties
for
‘Egregious’
Spraying,
FARMPROGRESS
(Mar.
9,
2017),
https://www.farmprogress.com/weeds/arkansas-bills-would-increase-penalties-egregious-spraying).
Others reported that paying a fine for offsite injury was more economical than an alternative weed control.
Dan Charles, Despite A Ban, Arkansas Farmers Are Still Spraying Controversial Weedkiller, THE SALT
(Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2018/10/09/654847573/despite-a-ban-arkansasfarmers-are-still-spraying-controversial-weedkiller; see also S.B. 2108, 102d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill.
2021-2022) (proposing to increase fines for violating the Illinois Pesticide Act).
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Moreover, lawsuits by a state government do not compensate injured
property owners. 175
B.

State Registrations

State governments issuing new registrations for dicamba products in
2018 and 2020 knew that the products had a known propensity to drift
and volatilize and that unwarranted offsite injuries had accompanied
usage of previously-registered dicamba products.176 For the 2018
registrations, the absence of an omnidirectional buffer in areas where
endangered species were not present meant volatilization could release
dicamba particles onto non-target properties.177 For the 2020
registrations, the knowledge that applicators were violating the label
requirements meant dicamba particles could enter non-target
properties.178
Since states had knowledge that the use of dicamba products would
involve dicamba particles entering offsite properties, by issuing
registrations in 2018 and 2020, they took actions that granted applicators
easements. 179 Under the easements, applicators using dicamba products
might release dicamba particles that enter offsite properties, and the
property owners could not preclude the invasions. Because state
governments had authorized the activity of spraying dicamba products,
neighboring property owners had servient estates burdened by potential
injuries from offsite dicamba applications.
The registrations also raise a question of whether the states’ actions
might create § 1983 claims.180 A § 1983 claim involves conduct
committed by a person acting under color of state law that deprives a
person of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
175. The monies from penalties go to the state, and in Texas are deposited in the state’s general
reserve
fund.
Filing
an
Ag
Pesticide
Complaint,
TEX.
DEP’T
AGRIC.,
https://www.texasagriculture.gov/RegulatoryPrograms/Pesticides/AgriculturalApplicators/AgPesticideC
omplaintInvestigationProcedures.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2022).
176. The dicamba products were classified as restricted use pesticides. See EPA, 2018 OVER-THETOP DICAMBA PRODUCTS, supra note 13, at 5. All applicators were required to complete a mandatory
program for certification. 7 U.S.C. § 136i (a)(1) (2018).
177. The labels refer to buffer requirements only for areas where endangered species might be
present and require consultation outside of the label. See, e.g., EPA, 2020 Bayer XtendiMax Registration,
supra note 41, at 22 (requiring applicators to “follow the measures contained in the Endangered Species
Protection Bulletin”); EPA, 2020 Syngenta Tavium Registration, supra note 41, at 29 (requiring
applicators to visit http://www.epa.gov/espp/ to determine additional restrictions for endangered species).
178. Scientists at the EPA had noted that applicators may not be following the label instructions but
declined to estimate noncompliance. Chism Memorandum, supra note 14, at 27, 39. Label violations could
also occur because the label requirements were not technically feasible. Reed Letter, supra note 78, at 2.
179. The easement involved entries of dicamba particles from fields on which dicamba products
were applied.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
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States.181 Pesticide applicators, even though they are private entities, act
under color of state law when “there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the private conduct . . . .”182 If “a sufficiently close nexus
between the state and the private actor exist[s],” the action of the private
actor may be treated as that of the state.183
Pesticides are highly regulated and can only be used if registered by a
state.184 Moreover, each state handles complaints of pesticide misuse.
After 2018, all over-the-top dicamba products were restricted-use
pesticides, so each applicator was certified by a state government. 185
When states granted registrations for dicamba products for the 2019 and
subsequent growing seasons, they had knowledge from previously filed
complaints that significant offsite injuries had accompanied the use of
earlier registered products since 2017. While applicators applied
pesticides as private actors, the facts suggest a nexus existed between
states’ actions and the damages applicators inflicted on offsite
landowners. 186 Offsite properties were damaged only because the state
registered dicamba products and certified applicators. Evidence suggests
that the state knew over-the-top dicamba products could not be used
without causing injuries to offsite properties, yet they authorized
applicators to use the products.187
Physical invasions of dicamba particles onto neighboring properties
violate the right of property owners to exclude others from their
properties.188 The right to exclude is one of the strands of an owner’s
property rights that has traditionally been a treasured right of property
ownership.189 Persons owning property expect to be able to control who
enters their property and to enjoy their possession without unwanted
intrusions.190 The intrusions by dicamba particles authorized under state
181. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
182. McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Hogan v. A.O. Fox
Mem’l Hosp., 346 Fed. App’x 627, 629 (2d Cir. 2009)).
183. Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc., 975 F.3d 742, 756 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Jensen v.
Lane Cnty., 222 F.3d 570, 575 (9th Cir. 2000)).
184. See supra notes 25 and 33.
185. EPA, 2018 OVER-THE-TOP DICAMBA PRODUCTS, supra note 13, at 5.
186. See Rawson, 975 F.3d at 756.
187. EPA, 2018 Dicamba Registration Decision, supra note 17, at 11-12.
188. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (finding that
a permanent physical occupation denies a property owner the right to exclude to effect a taking).
189. See id. at 426 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979)). In Kaiser
Aetna, the Court noted that the government had taken away the right to exclude others from a pond that
was previously considered plaintiffs’ private property, and this effected a taking that needed to be
compensated. 444 U.S. at 179.
190. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). Furthermore, a government action
preempting owners’ right to enjoy their properties for an extended period may effect a taking. Ridge Line,
Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Mississippi v. United States, 146
Fed. Cl. 693, 705 (2020).
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registrations of dicamba products violated the right to exclude and led to
injuries causing monetary losses.191 By issuing registrations, states were
taking away offsite property owners’ right to exclude dicamba particles.
IV. TAKINGS AND POLICE POWERS
Governments are limited in actions that take property rights by the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Takings Clause applies to states.192 The
plain language of the Fifth Amendment requires a government to pay
compensation whenever it acquires an interest in private property for a
public purpose.193 Governments normally acquire property under eminent
domain proceedings by paying just compensation for the property interest
taken.194 However, governmental actions extinguishing property rights,
including the right to exclude, may also constitute takings.195 Whenever a
government appropriates a property interest, it needs to compensate the
owner.196 Compensation is due as soon as the private property has been
taken.197
A.

Categories of Takings

Courts have recognized three categories of takings: physical
appropriation, deprivation of value, and regulatory.198 Physical takings
involving appropriations of property by a government occur with the
occupation of the property.199 With courts describing physical takings as
“physical appropriation,” “physical occupation,” “physical invasion,”
“physical surrender,” “appropriation,” and “direct appropriation,” they
may recognize distinctions that alter what actions constitute per se

191. Due to the injury to vegetation, the intrusions of dicamba particles are consequential.
192. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 383 (1994).
193. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002).
194. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 374-75 (1945).
195. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 32 (2012); Cedar Point Nursery
v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072 (2021).
196. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 267; Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322.
197. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2171-72 (2019).
198. See Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2070; see also Lynn E. Blais, The Total Takings Myth, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 47, 54-59 (2017).
199. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982). Yet, there also
exist governmental appropriations that are physical but do not occupy private property. Appropriations
that are not occupations raise the question of whether they should be treated the same. See John D.
Echeverria, What Is a Physical Taking, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 731, 739 (2020).
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takings.200 A court may find a governmental action that is less than an
occupation effects a taking. Physical takings are often referred to as per
se takings and compensation is mandated, although there are
exceptions.201 Deprivation of value occurs when a government’s action
totally deprives an owner of the beneficial use of property. 202 In the
absence of any beneficial use, the owner needs to be compensated. 203
Regulatory takings involve restrictions imposed on property by a
government that go too far in limiting owners’ rights in using their
properties.204 Temporary invasions, environmental regulations, and
zoning requirements constitute actions that may result in a regulatory
taking.205
The Takings Clause originally applied to physical appropriations of
property.206 Yet, pursuant to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,207 the
Takings Clause was recognized as also imposing limits on the exercise of
a state’s police power. 208 In Pennsylvania Coal, the Pennsylvania
legislature had enacted an act that forbade the mining of anthracite coal
in such way as to cause the subsidence of some structures, including those
used for human habitation.209 The Court found the act could not be
sustained as an exercise of the state’s police powers. 210 While states can
regulate activities and matters affecting public health, safety, morals, or
welfare,211 Pennsylvania Coal recognized that there are limitations.212
200. Echeverria, supra note 199, at 746.
201. See id. at 750-54, 763; see also generally PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980).
202. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992).
203. See id. at 1019.
204. E.g., in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922), the state’s Kohler Act
prohibiting mining in certain locales was not a legitimate exercise of its police power. However, an
agency’s moratoria did not effect a regulatory taking in Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan.
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 (2022), and treating a lot as a single parcel was correct, so the petitioners
could not establish a compensable taking in Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949 (2017).
205. The denial of an owner’s use of property for a number of years was a taking requiring
compensation in First Eng. Evang. Luth. Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). Conversely,
the “diminution of value was insufficient to establish a regulatory taking” in Clayland Farm Enterprises,
Inc. v. Talbot Cnty., 987 F.3d 346, 354 (4th Cir. 2021), and limits on over-development did not effect a
regulatory taking in Quinn v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Queen Anne’s Cnty., 862 F.3d 433, 442 (4th Cir.
2017). Presented with issue of whether a zoning ordinance effected a taking, the Palazzolo Court held it
needed be examined under the test enunciated in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978). Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001).
206. This meant that the “Takings Clause originally did not extend to regulations of property.”
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1057.
207. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
208. Id. at 415-16.
209. Id. at 412-13.
210. Id. at 414.
211. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1897).
212. A state law making it commercially impracticable to mine some coal deposits had the same
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Regulations that go too far may effect a regulatory taking. 213
Although the Takings Clause places limits on the exercise of police
powers, exercises of those police powers do not amount to takings merely
because they restrict property uses.214 Governments could not function if
they had to pay for any action that resulted in diminishing property
values.215 Requiring compensation in all circumstances where a
landowner’s economic returns are diminished by a government’s action
would compel the government to regulate by purchase. 216 Police powers
restrictions enacted to safeguard the public good may preclude uses of
property generating the greatest financial returns whenever the public
benefits are felt to be more important.217
B.

Upholding Police Powers

Historical examples show courts recognizing governmental police
powers in upholding laws and regulations that severely impacted property
owners. In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, the Supreme Court upheld a
petitioner’s misdemeanor conviction for violating a city ordinance that
forced the petitioner to abandon his business.218 The petitioner’s business
was a brickyard that caused sickness and serious discomfort to nearby
residents.219 By upholding the ordinance, the Court distinguished the
operation of the business from the deposits of clay on petitioner’s land.220
Since the petitioner could still remove the clay, he was not totally
deprived of his property.221 Rather, an objectionable business activity was
being regulated under the city’s police powers, which did not require
compensation even if the ordinance compelled him to abandon his
business.222
Another landmark case, decided in 1928, involved a state regulation
that resulted in the destruction of landowners’ trees.223 In Miller v.
Schoene, the state entomologist ordered the plaintiffs to cut down their
effect as appropriating or destroying it so was a taking. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.
213. Id.; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617; Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1942.
214. See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592, 594 (1906)
(noting that the police power can be exerted for the general well-being on the community); Marianist
Province of the United States v. City of Kirkwood, 944 F.3d 996, 1006 (8th Cir. 2019) (finding that
restrictions on lighting limits were a valid exercise of the city’s police power).
215. See Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
216. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
217. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921).
218. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404 (1915).
219. Id. at 405, 408.
220. Id. at 411.
221. Id. at 408.
222. Id. at 405.
223. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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cedar trees under the state’s Cedar Rust Act.224 Cedar trees are host plants
of the cedar rust disease, which is a menace to the health of apple trees.225
In enacting the state Cedar Rust Act, the legislature sought to preclude
apple trees from serious injury and thus decided that cedar trees needed
to be destroyed to preserve the state’s apple production.226 The Supreme
Court decided that destroying cedar trees to save apple trees from disease
was justified so there was no compensable taking. 227
A town’s prohibition of excavations below the water table by an
ordinance provided another opportunity for a court to decide whether the
action was a valid exercise of police powers or a taking. In Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, the Supreme Court examined whether the ordinance
was in the public interest and whether the means were reasonably
necessary to accomplish the purpose.228 Although the ordinance
completely prohibited a beneficial use of the owners’ property, the town’s
interest in protecting its citizens was sufficient to justify its action.229 The
town’s prohibition of injurious uses of property could not be deemed a
taking;230 thus, the property owners did not need to be compensated for
their losses.
Since the Takings Clause was not intended to terminate police powers,
takings jurisprudence balances police powers purposes with the rights of
property owners. 231 Governments are entrusted with authority to take
actions under their police powers that restrict the use of property.232
Although property owners enjoy rights to use their properties, these rights
can be curtailed by governmental actions.233 However, if a law or a
regulation is too burdensome, it effects a regulatory taking.234 For
regulatory takings, neither a physical appropriation nor a public use is
required. 235 Rather, the aggrieved property owner establishes that the
government’s action imposes such a substantial burden that it effects an
unconstitutional taking.236 Whenever a government’s action is found to
224. Id. at 277.
225. Id. at 278.
226. Id. at 278-79.
227. Id. at 277, 279.
228. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593-95 (1962).
229. Id. at 595 (finding the ordinance was a safety measure).
230. Id. at 593.
231. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 594 (1906) (noting “the
tranquility of every well-ordered community”); Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (noting
a government’s “power to adjus[t] rights for the ‘public good.’”).
232. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co., 200 U.S. at 584.
233. This may include an action by a government that destroys property. See Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).
234. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
235. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 (2022).
236. See E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523 (1998) (citing United States v. Sperry Corp.,
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be excessive, a court can find it effects a regulatory taking and order
payment or invalidate the regulation.237
V. CEDAR POINT’S EXPANSION OF PER SE PHYSICAL TAKINGS
Courts have retreated from upholding laws and regulations as part of a
government’s police powers to acknowledge greater rights for property
owners. In 1992, Pennsylvania Coal held that a physical invasion was not
a necessary prerequisite for finding a taking so that laws adversely
affecting property owners could be found to effect takings.238 In 2006,
Horne v. U.S. Department of Agriculture (“Horne II”) found that
governmental appropriations of personal property pursuant to a federal
regulation violated the Takings Clause.239
Another retreat from earlier interpretations of the Takings Clause
occurred in 2021 with the Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid decision.240 The
California Agricultural Labor Relations Board (”Board“) had
promulgated an access regulation that provided authority for union
organizers to “take access” to private properties.241 Under the regulation’s
right to take access provision, organizers from the United Farm Workers
temporarily entered the property of a strawberry grower in order to solicit
support for unionization.242 Union organizers also attempted to access
another grower’s property but were blocked by the grower’s company. 243
Although no governmental official entered the growers’ properties and
the entry to the Cedar Point Nursery was temporary, the Court decided
the regulation effected a per se physical taking.244
A.

Rights to Invade and Exclude

In Cedar Point, the growers argued that a state regulation requiring
them to admit union representatives to their properties effected a taking
of property protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause.245 By
compelling growers to allow entries of union organizers, the Board’s

493 U.S. 52, 60 (1989)).
237. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1071 n.6.
238. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415-16.
239. See generally Horne v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 576 U.S. 350 (2015). This case followed an earlier
Supreme Court decision in the same case, Horne v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2054 (2013).
240. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2063 (2011).
241. Id. at 2074-77.
242. Id. at 2069-70. See CAL. CODE REGS. Tit. 8, § 20900 (2020).
243. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2070.
244. Id. at 2070.
245. Id. at 2069-71.
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access regulation sanctioned a physical invasion of the property. 246 The
Court felt the invasions appropriated a portion of growers’ properties in a
manner that was no less than a physical taking.247 In defining what was
appropriated, the Court enunciated two rights that were taken by the
regulation: the right to invade and the right to exclude.248 By appropriating
these rights, the regulation effected a physical taking.
The access regulation allowed union organizers to enter private
property for three hours per day, 120 days per year.249 By enabling these
entries, the Cedar Point Court decided that “[t]he access regulation
appropriate[d] a right to invade growers’ properties.”250 Although the
Court did not cite any source delineating a “right to invade,” it found that
the Board’s regulation appropriated an easement on growers’ properties
that allowed entry by union organizers. 251 While the entries of union
organizers were temporary, the Court felt they should be treated in the
same manner as permanent occupations.252
In addition to the right to invade, the Board’s regulation also
appropriated growers’ right to exclude others from their properties. 253
Drawing from the Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
decision,254 the Court noted that the right to exclude is one of the most
treasured rights of property ownership,255 and proceeded to find it was
“one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights . . . characterized
as property.”256 To vindicate this right, the Court concluded that the
appropriation of growers’ right to exclude was a taking requiring
compensation.257 Furthermore, by appropriating the right to invade and
extinguishing the right to exclude, the regulation effected a per se
physical taking.258

246. Id. at 2072.
247. Id. The Court cites the physical taking of Horne v. Dept. of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 361 (2015)
[hereinafter Horne II], as support for finding a physical taking. Yet Horne II involved a physical
appropriation of personal property while Cedar Point involved the appropriation of rights.
248. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2072-73.
249. Id. at 2072. The 120 days needed to be divided into four 30-day periods. CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
8, § 20900(e)(1)(A) (2020). The three hours per day were limited to an hour before work, an hour during
the workers’ lunch break, and an hour after work. Id. §§ 20900(e)(3)(A)-(B).
250. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2072.
251. Id. at 2073.
252. Id. at 2074 (“There is no reason the law should analyze an abrogation of the right to exclude
in one manner if it extends for 365 days, but in an entirely different manner if it lasts for 364.”).
253. Id.
254. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 435 (1982) (finding that a
minor but permanent physical occupation of an owner's property constituted a taking).
255. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2072.
256. Id. (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 179-80 (1979)).
257. Id. at 2070-74.
258. Id. at 2072-73.
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The Cedar Point Court relied on its Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency259 precedent for support that the
taking of a leasehold, whether temporary or permanent, required
compensation.260 Tahoe-Sierra distinguished “classic takings,” in which
governments directly appropriate private property, from “regulatory
takings” involving interferences with property rights.261 Allegations
involving interferences need to be resolved under the approach prescribed
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. Cty. of New York262 for regulatory
takings.263 Cedar Point found that the Board’s access regulation
appropriated property rights – the right to invade and the right to
exclude. 264 Since the Board’s regulation appropriated rights rather than
simply interfering with rights, there was a classic taking and the rights of
growers did not need to be balanced with the Board’s police powers as
required for regulatory takings.265
The Cedar Point Court also relied on its earlier precedent in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission266 for its finding “that the appropriation
of an easement constitutes a physical taking.”267 Nollan involved a
permanent physical occupation by individuals with a continuous right to
pass to and fro across the Nollans’ property. 268 The government’s
permanent occupation in Nollan was a physical appropriation of a
property interest that constituted a taking.269 Thus, the Cedar Point Court
found that the Board’s appropriation of an easement constituted a physical
taking.270 Although the easement only allowed temporary entries by union
organizers, the Court opined that the Board’s regulation granted a right to
physically invade growers’ properties so that the entries were per se
physical takings.271 Cedar Point concluded that the authorization of
temporary entries should be treated in the same manner as permanent

259. See generally Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
260. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2042.
261. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323.
262. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (delineating several
factors to be examined to determine whether a regulation effects a taking). See infra notes 343-345 and
accompanying text.
263. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342 (“[T]he interest in ‘fairness and justice’ will be best served by
relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like this, rather than by attempting to
craft a new categorical rule.”).
264. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2072 & 2074.
265. It appropriated the right of access to growers’ property and a right to physically invade the
growers’ property. Id. at 2074.
266. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
267. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2073.
268. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832.
269. Id. (“We think a ‘permanent physical occupation’ has occurred.”).
270. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2073.
271. Id. at 2074 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 20900(e)(1)(C)).
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occupations rather than restrictions on the use of property. 272
By recognizing a right to invade as a property right and finding that
temporary invasions needed to be treated the same as permanent
occupations, the Court expanded the situations in which governmental
regulations would effect a taking. As noted by the dissent, previous
takings law defined two narrow categories of government conduct that
were per se takings.273 These were: (1) appropriating private property for
its own use274 and (2) permanent occupations of private property.275
Cedar Point adds a third category: regulations that temporarily limit an
owner’s right to exclude others. 276 The Court rejected earlier precedents
suggesting that temporary physical invasions were not the same as
permanent occupations.277 Pursuant to Cedar Point, governments
engaging in activities that involve temporary entries on private property
may incur liability for a taking.278
B.

Appropriations of Rights

Appropriations of a right to invade and a right to exclude interfere with
property rights that may effect a taking.279 However, rights of property
owners are not the only rights that need to be considered. Under their
police powers, states have the right to enact reasonable laws and
regulations.280 Regulations that are a legitimate exercise of the
government’s police power can be upheld even if they diminish property
owners’ rights.281 Miller v. Schoene allowed a government to destroy

272. Id.
273. Id. at 2082 (dissent).
274. Id.; see Horne II, 576 U. S. 350, 357 (2015).
275. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2082 (dissent) (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528,
538 (2005)).
276. The state regulation regulates the owners’ right to exclude, which is distinct from an
occupation. Id. at 2083.
277. The Loretto Court opined that there existed a constitutional distinction between permanent
occupations and temporary physical invasions. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.
S. 419, 434 (1982). Loretto implied that only permanent physical occupations were per se physical takings
because the occupation of property forever denied the owner power to control the use of the property. Id.
at 436. Since governments retain broad powers to impose appropriate restrictions on uses of properties,
Loretto felt that temporary invasions needed to be examined further for determining whether there is a
regulatory taking. Id. at 435 n.12. The rationale for further inquiry was that temporary entries “do not
absolutely dispossess the owner of his rights to use, and exclude others from, his property.” Id.
278. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2074.
279. Id. at 2075 (citing Nollan as support for a nonpermanent invasion may be a taking).
280. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1947 (2017) (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 627 (2001)).
281. This would occur when a petitioner does not show a deprivation of all economic value and the
matter needs to be remanded to the lower court to analyze the taking allegation. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at
631.
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cedar trees without compensating the owners for the property taken. 282
The reasonable expectations of property owners need to be balanced with
the legitimate governmental goals expressed through regulations.283
The fact that a government appropriated a right to invade or to exclude,
or both, does not answer the question of whether an unconstitutional
taking has occurred because these rights are residual rights.284 Although
the Cedar Point Court cited the right to invade as a property right, it never
divulged any state or federal legal source of the right. 285 In Cedar Point,
the right to invade involved the placement of an easement on growers’
properties.286 Yet temporary easements for a number of purposes have
been recognized as not effecting compensable takings. 287 Moreover, an
entry under the police power is not a per se taking if it does not
appropriate property for a public use.288 Cedar Point blurs the distinctions
between per se and regulatory takings. Earlier precedents recognized that
per se takings require a public purpose or a public use whereas regulatory
takings do not.289
Given the appropriation of a right to exclude, this right is a residual
right subject to exceptions, such as regulations for public safety.290 Since
property rights are a bundle of rights, that bundle may vary depending on
the circumstances, including a government’s purpose in enacting a
regulation.291 A regulation destroying a single strand of a bundle of
property rights is not always a taking.292 The right of a government to take
282. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928).
283. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947, 1951.
284. Since the right to exclude is a residual right, it only applies after consideration has been given
to exceptions set forth by statutes or common law. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude
II, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1, 8 (2014).
285. A source for the right is needed as the Constitution protects rights. See Echeverria, supra note
199, at 782.
286. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2075 (2011).
287. The Court noted some involving health and safety inspections. Id. at 2080. Furthermore,
unusual circumstances may mean that a governmental occupation does not deprive the property owner of
any use of the property so would not be a compensable taking. See Nat. Bd. of Young Men’s Christian
Ass’ns, 395 U.S. 85 (1969) (citing entry by firemen).
288. See Lech v. Jackson, 791 Fed. Appx. 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2019) (finding that the conduct
damaging the property did not take property for a public use).
289. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002) (noting a
public purpose requirement for physical takings but an ad hoc, factual inquiry for regulatory takings). The
Court also found that “neither a physical appropriation nor a public use has ever been a necessary
component of a ‘regulatory taking.’” Id. at 326. The reason for requiring a public purpose for a physical
taking is to preclude claims premised on governmental actions with unintended consequences. See Sandra
B. Zellmer, Takings, Torts, and Background Principles, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 193, 218 (2017).
290. This was recognized in Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326 n.22; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978) (acknowledging that a state might even destroy real
property interests by regulating public health).
291. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731 (1998).
292. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
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action for public safety was recognized by the Supreme Court in Mugler
v. Kansas and subsequent cases.293 Mugler found that prohibitions on the
use of property under the police power are not appropriations of property
for the public benefit.294 Precedents show that governments may even
demolish buildings on private property without compensation if they have
been found to constitute a public nuisance and the government complied
with procedural prerequisites.295 Courts have found that rights to invade
and exclude held by property owners may be reduced in certain situations
without effecting a taking.296
The Cedar Point Court acknowledged that governments can require
property owners to cede a right of access to their properties as a condition
for receiving benefits.297 Permits allowing access for government health
and safety inspections do not constitute takings.298 Legitimate police
power purposes, such as building height restrictions, should not be found
to be a taking in situations where a government refuses to issue a
permit.299 However, the Cedar Point Court declined to find a police power
purpose associated with entries by union organizers onto growers’
properties.300 Because the entries were not pursuant to any traditional
principle of property law and were “not germane to any benefit provided
to agricultural employers or any risk posed to the public,” the Court felt
they were not based on a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power. 301
Governmentally authorized entries of union organizers on private
property effected a taking.
VI. ENTRIES OF DICAMBA PARTICLES AND TAKINGS LAW
When dicamba products are applied to cropland in a manner that
injures non-target vegetation, dicamba particles physically invade offsite
properties. Should these invasions be found to effect takings? As noted
by the Supreme Court, there is no magic formula that enables a court to
determine whether a government interference with property is a taking.302

293. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887); see First Eng. Evang. Luth. Church v. Cnty. of
L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 325-26 (1987) (acknowledging governments’ rights to condemn unsafe structures,
close businesses, and destroy property).
294. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69.
295. See Davet v. City of Cleveland, 456 F.3d 549, 553 (6th Cir. 2006); Embassy Realty Invs., Inc.
v. City of Cleveland, 572 Fed. Appx. 339, 344 (6th Cir. 2014).
296. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994).
297. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2079.
298. Id. at 2079; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 489 (1987).
299. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987).
300. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2080.
301. Id.
302. See id. at 2074-75; Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31, 40 (2012).
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Although not every physical invasion is a taking,303 some do constitute
takings.304 An examination of judicial precedents suggests three options
for evaluating whether dicamba invasions should be considered to effect
a compensable taking. First, since state registrations of dicamba products
appropriate the right to exclude as well as vegetation and crops, they
might be found to effect physical takings. Second, a state’s approval of
registrations allowing invasions might be examined as a regulatory
taking. Alternatively, the entries of dicamba particles may be torts.305 If
they are torts, they need to be addressed under traditional tort law.
A. Physical Appropriations
States allowing dicamba products to be sold have granted pesticide
applicators easements over neighboring properties upon which they can
deposit dicamba particles. Since the particles permanently settle on nontarget properties to injure and kill vegetation, the offsite property owners
are suffering property losses. Given the Supreme Court’s precedents of
Horne v. United States (“Horne II”) and Cedar Point, these facts suggest
that the states have physically taken property for which compensation
must be paid.306
In Horne II, the Supreme Court found a taking of personal property
from raisin growers.307 Congress had adopted a marketing act308
authorizing the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to
promulgate market orders to maintain stable markets for agricultural
commodities.309 Under a duly promulgated order, the government
required a percentage of raisins be set aside in a reserve for future
disposal.310 Raisin growers were not paid for raisins going into the
reserve, although partial remuneration could occur at a later time.311 The
growers in Horne II declined to set aside any raisins for the government’s
303. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 435 n.12 (1982).
304. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 568 U.S. at 26-30. Upon remand, the circuit court concluded
there was no taking for portions of the acreage as the damage was moderate. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n
v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
305. To determine whether an invasion should be treated as a tort, courts have used a two-part test.
See, e.g., Golf Vill. N., LLC v. City of Powell, 14 F.4th 611, 621-22 (6th Cir. 2021).
306. Horne v. United States, 576 U.S. 351 (2015); Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063,
2080 (2011).
307. Horne II, 576 U.S. at 354-55.
308. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246 (1937) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§
601, 602, 608a-608e, 610, 612, 614, 624, 627, 671-674 (2018)).
309. Horne II, 576 U.S. at 354-55.
310. Id. at 355.
311. Id. The circuit court had noted that the Hornes did not lose all the value of their personal
property as the marketing act’s equitable distribution provisions enabled gross proceeds to be paid to
growers in some years. Horne v. U.S.D.A., 750 F.3d 1128, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2014).
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reserve, leading the government to assess a fine equal to the market value
of the raisins required to be set aside plus a penalty. 312 The growers
appealed to the circuit court, claiming that the reserve requirement was
an unconstitutional taking of their property.313
The circuit court found that the reserve requirement was a restriction
on growers’ property in exchange for a government benefit rather than a
taking.314 Furthermore, it was noted that growers received compensation
from raisins that were set aside in the reserve in years when the gross
proceeds were greater that the operating expenses.315 Contrary to the
observation of compensation found by the circuit court, the Supreme
Court decided that partial remuneration was speculative. 316 The Supreme
Court also declined to acknowledge the significant benefits provided by
the raisin program in achieving an orderly market for raisin growers. 317
By finding that owners of the raisins in the reserve lost all of their property
rights, the Court decided that the reserve amounted to a physical taking
rather than a use restriction.318
The Horne II decision has not been met with approval.319 Physical
takings normally require an invasion, yet the government did not invade
the growers’ properties.320 The Court failed to consider the argument that
there is a distinction between takings of real versus personal property. 321
The Court also failed to consider whether the seizure of personal property
should be recognized as a per se taking.322 Seizure and confiscation of
adulterated and misbranded drug and food articles by the federal
government is allowed under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic

312. Horne II, 576 U.S. at 356.
313. Id.
314. Horne v. U.S.D.A., 750 F.3d at 1142.
315. Id. at 1140-41.
316. Horne II, 576 U.S. at 362.
317. Id. at 357. The benefit was provided due to the provisions of the marketing order. 7 U.S.C. §
602(1) (2018).
318. Horne II, 576 U.S. at 361.
319. See, e.g., Mark Klock, A Raisin in Reserve, Takings, and the Problem of Government Price
Supports, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 713, 728-39 (2016) (observing that the majority failed to follow
precedents “that the appropriate measure of compensation in a per se taking is the fair market value at the
time of the taking”); John D. Echeverria & Michael C. Blumm, Horne v. Department of Agriculture:
Expanding Per Se Takings While Endorsing State Sovereign Ownership of Wildlife; 75 MD. L. REV. 657,
677-678 (2016) (arguing that Horne II’s new per se rule “lacked support from the text of the Constitution,
history, or relevant precedent); Richard A. Epstein, The Unfinished Business of Horne v. Department of
Agriculture, 10 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 734, 776 (2016) (concluding that the court failed “to embrace a
systematic approach to the general takings question”); Carol M. Rose, Rations and Takings, 2020 WIS. L.
REV. 343, 350 (inquiring as to what was invaded since there was no physical entry).
320. Rose, supra note 319, at 358.
321. See Blais, supra note 198, at 58; Echeverria & Blumm, supra note 319, at 677-678.
322. Echeverria & Blumm, supra note 319, at 668-88.
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Act.323 Governmental actions in criminal forfeiture actions, unwholesome
food removals, cases of animal abuse, and adulterated drugs allowing the
seizure of property have long been recognized as legitimate operations,
all of which remove personal property from owners without invoking a
requirement for compensation.324
Since various governmental actions involving seizure have been
recognized as permissible, Horne II’s per se theory for raisins placed in a
governmental reserve expanded takings jurisprudence. The raisin reserve
program effected a governmentally authorized appropriation of personal
property, similar to seizures of adulterated food items, yet the Court
decided it was a per se physical taking. This revised definition of per se
physical takings allows courts to decide that governmental actions
extracting an interest in personal property are takings without considering
the underlying government justification.325 Such an interpretation will
limit government police power purposes enacted or adopted to achieve
health, safety, and general well-being benefits.
Another question after Horne II is whether a net adverse economic
effect is required. 326 The Court felt the Hornes had lost the fair market
value of the raisins because of the government’s fine. 327 Yet, as noted by
justices concurring in part and dissenting in part, the Hornes and other
raisin growers received benefits under the raisin program.328 The justices
noted that “benefits received could be properly regarded as compensation
pro tanto for the property appropriated to public use.”329 The Court
rejected the dissent’s argument and ruled that offsetting benefits did not
apply to the issue.330 This ignored the fact that condemnation statutes
allow offsets for benefits331 based on the premise “that taxpayers should
not be required to pay more than reasonably necessary for public works
projects.”332 The raisin program was established to benefit raisin

323. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1) (2018). See United States v. Vitak Supply Corp., 144 F.3d 476, 480 (7th
Cir. 1998) (upholding convictions for distributing adulterated or misbranded animal drugs); United States
v. 5 Unlabeled Boxes, 572 F.3d 169, 176 (3rd Cir. 2009) (affirming forfeiture of products manufactured
by the defendant).
324. Echeverria & Blumm, supra note 319, at 674.
325. Horne II, 576 U.S. at 362.
326. Echeverria & Blumm, supra note 319, at 680-83.
327. Horne II, 576 U.S. at 370.
328. Id. at 373-76.
329. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Many condemnation statutes allow
the deductions of special benefits, and such meet the requirement of “just compensation.” See L.A. Cnty.
Metro. Trans. Auth. v. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809, 824 (Cal. 1997).
330. Horne II, 576 U.S. at 369.
331. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 568 (1897); United States v. River Rouge Improvement
Co., 269 U.S. 411, 414 (1926); Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 811; Long v. Shirley, 14 S.E.2d 375, 377,
380 (Va. 1941).
332. Cont’l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d at 823.
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growers. 333 By not allowing direct benefits to offset the economic
burdens, the Horne II Court established a new rule for takings of personal
property.334 This new rule expanded physical takings.
Turning to the property interests taken by state registrations of dicamba
products, some plants were killed, and others were so adversely affected
that yields or amenity values were lower.335 In a manner analogous to the
reserve requirement in Horne II, state registrations are taking property
interests. Since the raisin reserve requirement was “a clear physical
taking” rather than a use restriction,336 entries by dicamba harming offsite
vegetation are also physical takings. Owners suffering losses from the
state’s appropriation of their vegetation should be compensated for the
property interests taken. Compensation is due whether the interest taken
is the entire object or merely a part thereof. 337
While Horne II involved a physical appropriation of property by
government officials, Cedar Point reveals that appropriations may also
occur due to property rights being taken. In Cedar Point, the state’s
appropriation consisted of the rights to invade and exclude. The
government’s authorization for unions to take these rights was found to
effect a per se physical taking.338 In a similar manner, the state dicamba
registrations take rights to invade and exclude, thereby depriving offsite
owners of valuable property rights. The value of these rights is shown by
the vegetation losses suffered by neighboring property owners. States
should pay for the property interests taken.
B. Regulatory Takings
Many takings claims require situation-specific factual inquires to
determine whether a compensable taking exists. 339 By finding the
333. The Court mentioned the benefit of an orderly raison market but felt it should not force growers
to participate in a manner where not all their crop is sold at market rates. Horne II, 576 U.S. at 366.
334. Epstein, supra note 319, at 747.
335. Some of the injuries were to trees and ornamentals that were planted in residential settings.
See Science of Dicamba, supra note 34, at 6-8; Brian R. Dintelmann, Michele R. Warmund, Mandy D.
Bish & Kevin W. Bradley, Investigations of the Sensitivity of Ornamental, Fruit, and Nut Plant Species
to Driftable Rates of 2,4-D and Dicamba, 34 WEED TECH. 331 (2019); Brian Dintelmann, David Trinklein
& Kevin Bradley, Response of Common Garden Annuals to Sublethal Rates of 2,4-D and Dicamba with
or Without Glyphosate, 30 HORTTECHNOLOGY 411 (2020). Another problem in Texas where dicamba is
used in the production of cotton is that nearby wine grapes are being adversely affected. Jeff Siegel, How
Herbicides Are Threatening Texas Wine Production, WINE ENTHUSIAST MAG. (July 18, 2022),
https://www.winemag.com/2022/07/18/how-herbicides-are-threatening-texas-wine-production/; Michael
Hardy, The Texas Wine Industry Is Just Getting Started. Grape Farmers Say the End Is Near, TEX.
MONTHLY (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/texas-wine-industry-dicamba/.
336. Horne II, 576 U.S. at 357, 361.
337. Id. at 363.
338. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072 (2011).
339. See In re Upstream Addicks and Barker (Tex.) Flood-Control Reservoirs, 138 Fed. Cl. 658,
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invasion by union organizers constituted a per se physical taking
requiring compensation, Cedar Point did not need to examine the Board’s
regulation as a regulatory taking.340 However, the expansion of the
Takings Clause by Pennsylvania Coal requires compensating property
owners when restrictions go too far.341 A regulatory taking occurs when
the government acts in a regulatory capacity that goes so far that it is
considered to effect a taking.342 By issuing registrations for dicamba
products, states granted easements allowing applications of dicamba that
injured and killed offsite vegetation. Did the registrations go too far in
enabling dicamba particles to take offsite owners’ property interests?
The injuries due to state dicamba registrations diminish the value of
owners’ property interests without completely eliminating the value of
offsite properties. Under a regulatory taking analysis, the Penn Central
balancing test is employed to examine a complex set of factors to
determine whether a government’s action went too far.343 The analysis
examines the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investmentbacked expectations, and the character of the governmental action.344
Given the interest lost due to injuries from dicamba was part of a crop
for one year, the degree of loss for most offsite property owners would be
insufficient to constitute a regulatory taking. Under the Penn Central test,
the loss would be calculated by looking at the loss of value due to injury
from dicamba divided by the value of the property in the absence of
injury.345 Although an injured property owner would have potential lower
yields from fields suffering injury, in most cases, there would be other
fields and property that were not adversely affected. Judicial precedents
require all an owner’s property be considered in calculating a loss.346 The
damages incurred by dicamba invasions probably would not be
significant with relation to an owner’s entire property. Most injured
property owners would not suffer sufficient losses to establish a
regulatory taking under a Penn Central test.
However, while the Penn Central factors are important, Kaiser Aetna
v. United States noted that the overarching concern is whether justice and
fairness require that economic injuries caused by public action be
664 (2018) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
340. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2074.
341. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415; see also Horne II, 576 U.S. at 360.
342. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 617 (2001); Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017).
343. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1942-43.
344. Id.
345. See Daniel A. Farber, Murr v. Wisconsin and the Future of Takings Law, 2017 SUP. CT. REV.
115, 117 (2018).
346. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945-46.
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compensated by the government rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons.347 Subsequently, the Court reiterated this
concern in Murr v. Wisconsin: public burdens should be borne by the
public as a whole rather than being placed on a few individuals.348
Adhering to the views expressed by the Kaiser Aetna and Murr Courts on
justice and fairness, might it be concluded that the state registration of
dicamba products effected a regulatory taking?
The state registrations condoned invasions of pesticide particles even
though offsite entries of pesticides were illegal under common law.349
States forced offsite property owners to bear burdens which longstanding
principles of property law had previously placed on users of the products.
If a state wants to allow producers to use dicamba products due to the
benefits to growers, communities, and its economy, in all fairness, it
should bear the related costs. States should compensate injuries on nontarget properties so that the burdens are not placed on offsite neighbors.
This could occur under a dicamba compensation program funded by a fee
on dicamba products sold350 or by finding that the registrations effect
takings.
While it can be argued that grounding a takings argument on fairness
and justice fails to define a realistic test for determining whether there is
a taking, condoning state actions that lead to private property interests
being destroyed is unreasonable. The question is whether courts are ready
to again expand takings jurisprudence to protect private property rights.
The Supreme Court has expanded takings in three major decisions:
Pennsylvania Coal, Horne II, and Cedar Point. With the ascendancy of
private property rights, a court might decide that state dicamba
registrations unfairly burden offsite property owners. Since the
registrations allow activities that are inconsistent with longstanding
background principles of property law, the public should pay rather than
offsite property owners.
C. Tort Injuries
Cedar Point noted the trespass versus taking distinction and stated that
many government-authorized physical invasions will not amount to
347. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). Murr is in agreement: Public burdens
should be borne by the public as a whole rather than being placed on a few individuals. Murr, 137 S. Ct.
at 1943.
348. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943.
349. Courts have noted that the movement of pesticide particles offsite may be a trespass and
nuisance. See Terence J. Centner, Damages from Pesticide Spray Drift Under Trespass Law, 41 ECOL. L.
CURRENTS 1, 4-10 (2014).
350. Centner, supra note 65, at 1174-80; see also Minn. H.F. No. 1450 (2021) (proposing a
compensation fund for injuries from dicamba products in Minnesota).
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takings because they are consistent with longstanding background
restrictions on property rights.351 The Court noted several governmentauthorized physical invasions that would not result in takings. For
example, entries for health and safety inspections352 and events of public
or private necessity undertaken to avert harm do not effect takings.353
Other cases noted that a government’s acquisition of property under the
authority of a forfeiture statute354 and physical invasions authorized by
state statutes involving the common-law privilege to enter for survey
purposes are not takings.355 Yet, entries by union organizers authorized
under state law to protect labor peace were not treated as trespasses even
though they could be achieved through labor organizations.356
The physical invasions of dicamba particles should not be treated as
torts because authorized invasions are contrary to traditional background
principles of property law. Under common law negligence, nuisance and
trespass, offsite entries of unwanted pesticide particles are contrary to
existing law.357 Thus, the state registrations were condoning activities
inconsistent with longstanding background principles. Under the takingstrespass distinction enumerated in Cedar Point, invasions of dicamba
particles should be found to effect takings.
Proceeding further under Cedar Point’s approach for treating isolated
physical invasions as trespasses, the Court noted that invasions
undertaken pursuant to a granted right of access should not be treated as
trespasses.358 Since the state registrations of dicamba products allowed
applicators to apply dicamba even though it was known that particles
would invade offsite properties, the states granted access for the
invasions. Pursuant to the rationale of Cedar Point, by granting
applicators the right of access to offsite properties, the entries of dicamba
particles should not be treated as trespasses. The dicamba invasions
should be treated as takings.

351. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2079 (2011).
352. The Court noted entries for pesticide inspections, hydroelectric project investigations, and
pharmaceutical inspection would not effect takings. Id. at 2080.
353. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2079 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (AM. L. INST.
1964)).
354. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996) (distinguishing forfeiture from
eminent domain and finding that forfeitures do not effect takings).
355. See Klemic v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 673, 688-89 (W.D. Va. 2015).
356. See, e.g., 520 S. Michigan Ave. Assoc. v. Unite Here Local 1, 760 F.3d 708, 721 (7th Cir.
2014) (noting that a labor organization “is permitted some initial entry onto private property so it may
convey its views to the decision-makers of a secondary organization.”); San Diego Nursery Co. v. Agric.
Labor Relations Bd., 160 Cal. Rptr. 822, 825 (1979) (noting the state labor code allows union access to
growers’ properties).
357. See Centner, supra note 349, at 4-10.
358. Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2078-79.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. In
Nollan, a government-created easement authorizing entries onto
properties owned by others resulted in a physical appropriation of a
property interest that required compensation.359 When the federal
government adopted a regulation that appropriated personal property
without full payment in Horne II, the Supreme Court found the
government had taken the property and should pay for it.360 More
recently, Cedar Point found that a state regulation taking rights to invade
and exclude effected a per se physical taking requiring compensation
under the Takings Clause.361
State governments have issued registrations for dicamba products
known to be accompanied by spray drift and volatilization that can injure
vegetation on offsite properties. Under the registrations, pesticide
applicators secured easements condoning the entry of dicamba particles
onto offsite properties. The physical entries sometimes injured vegetation
that resulted in crop losses and dead plants. Since the injuries only
occurred because states registered dicamba products, the question is
whether the state should be liable for the property interests taken.
Both Horne II and Cedar Point support a conclusion that the state
dicamba registrations effected physical takings. Due to the registrations,
property interests were appropriated from offsite property owners. Under
the reasoning of Horne II, states should pay for the property interests
taken. The dicamba registrations allowed physical entries of dicamba
particles onto offsite properties that appropriated property interests.
Under the principles enunciated in Cedar Point, when rights to invade and
exclude are taken from property owners, the appropriations are
compensable as per se physical takings.
The Cedar Point Court felt that its treatment of an access regulation as
a per se physical taking would not endanger state and federal activities
involving entries onto private property.362 The Court claimed that by
recognizing exceptions for traditional common law privileges and
isolated events, its holding would not apply to many situations.363 Yet,
with the finding that the taking of rights to exclude and invade effect per
se physical takings, the potential exists that other property owners will
feel that various governmental actions meet this new definition of a
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987).
Horne II, 576 U.S. at 361.
Cedar Point, 141 S. Ct. at 2080.
Id. 2078-79.
Id.
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taking. The recognition of the rights to invade and exclude as per se
physical takings suggests that the Cedar Point decision will encourage
property owners to sue governments.
The dissent in Cedar Point noted three problems with the Court’s
failure to set clearly defined parameters. 364 First, large numbers of
government regulations permit entries onto lands owned by others.365 Do
these entries appropriate rights to exclude that effect takings? Second, the
Court did not define the traditional common law privileges allowing
governmental access to private property.366 The losses due to state
registrations of dicamba products disclose that there are some state
actions outside of traditional common law parameters. Third, what
definition will be assigned for isolated physical invasions?367 This issue
has been presented by cases involving governmental actions resulting in
flooding of private property.368
The issues raised by the dissent suggest that Cedar Point’s expanded
interpretation of per se physical takings increases the uncertainty and
unpredictability of takings law. In the absence of clearly defined
parameters, allegations that governmental actions effect takings is
expected to keep lawyers, governments, and courts busy interpreting how
the Takings Clause should be applied. As courts grant increased rights to
private property owners, governments may find they no longer have the
financial wherewithal to use their police powers in a manner that would
best serve their residents. From a societal perspective, limitations to
governments’ police powers may erode public order and thwart the will
of the majority. By denigrating the ability of governments to take actions
that are deemed beneficial, Cedar Point detracts from the quality of
communities that is a strength of a democracy.

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 2087-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
The dissent cited some of these. Id. at 2087.
Id.
Id. at 2088 (raising the question of whether temporary invasions are isolated).
See Zellmer, supra note 289, at 211-32.
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